Details zur Publikation
|Playing fair within climate protection policy? - Bringing together psychological and economic methods
|Ittner, H.; Ohl, C.
|ICFAI Journal of Environmental Law
|justice psychology; game theory; climate change
|The diffusion of greenhouse gases in the earth atmosphere confronts us with problems demanding both national and international cooperation. For every single state it is attractive that other countries commit themselves to climate protection whereas the own state – using the free-rider-strategy – benefits from the protective measures of the others without making any costly national contribution.
Such a strategic behaviour clashes with moral values, especially with justice motives in society. Should free-riding be preferred from the strategic point of view or rather, out of justice considerations, national commitments to contribute to climate protection? Therefore the analysis of how appraisals of justice and strategic considerations act together is a challenge to international (environmental) policy. Integrating a psychological-empirical approach of subjective perceptions of justice and a game-theoretic point of view we analyse what kind of influence the justice motive might have on the type of game nations are expected to play. Conclusions for further empirical and theoretical research are drawn.
|Ittner, H., Ohl, C. (2006):
Playing fair within climate protection policy? - Bringing together psychological and economic methods
ICFAI Journal of Environmental Law V (1), 34 - 53