Details zur Publikation

Kategorie Textpublikation
Referenztyp Zeitschriften
DOI 10.1002/eet.456
Titel (primär) The political economy of natural disaster insurance: lessons from the failure of a proposed compulsory insurance scheme in Germany
Autor Schwarze, R.; Wagner, G.G.
Quelle European Environment
Erscheinungsjahr 2007
Department OEKON
Band/Volume 17
Heft 6
Seite von 403
Seite bis 415
Sprache englisch
Keywords political economy; natural hazard; flood insurance; Germany; EU
Abstract This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such a scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political rejection of this proposal were the misperceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the German states on the implied administrative costs and the well known charity hazard of ad hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field.
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Schwarze, R., Wagner, G.G. (2007):
The political economy of natural disaster insurance: lessons from the failure of a proposed compulsory insurance scheme in Germany
European Environment 17 (6), 403 - 415 10.1002/eet.456