Details zur Publikation

Kategorie Textpublikation
Referenztyp Zeitschriften
DOI 10.3390/su10082902
Lizenz creative commons licence
Titel (primär) A theory of optimal green defaults
Autor Meran, G.; Schwarze, R.
Quelle Sustainability
Erscheinungsjahr 2018
Department OEKON
Band/Volume 10
Heft 8
Seite von art. 2902
Sprache englisch
Keywords nudge; policy mix; behavioural heterogeneity; environmental taxes and subsidies
Abstract This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
dauerhafte UFZ-Verlinkung
Meran, G., Schwarze, R. (2018):
A theory of optimal green defaults
Sustainability 10 (8), art. 2902 10.3390/su10082902