Details zur Publikation

Referenztyp Zeitschriften
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Titel (primär) Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?
Autor Meran, G.; Schwarze, R.
Journal / Serie European Journal of Law and Economics
Erscheinungsjahr 2010
Department OEKON
Band/Volume 30
Heft 2
Seite von 171
Seite bis 199
Sprache englisch
Keywords Liberal professions; Price regulation; Quality - Professional association - Self-regulation - EU competition policy - Intrinsic motivation
Abstract This paper studies the effects of a minimum price fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association on service quality and consumer surplus. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association's price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a deregulated market will always reproduce the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.
dauerhafte UFZ-Verlinkung https://www.ufz.de/index.php?en=20939&ufzPublicationIdentifier=10296
Meran, G., Schwarze, R. (2010):
Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?
Eur. J. Law Econ. 30 (2), 171 - 199