



Workpackage 5

# The Governance of Urban Shrinkage in Genoa.

Research report

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D10 Comparable research report

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## **Premise**

### **1. Background: National Framework**

This premise aims to clarify some characteristics of the Italian Normative Framework in which Policy Cycle, considering to Housing and Regeneration Policies and Cohesion Policy, have had to become in Genoa over the last thirty years.

#### *1.1 Housing policies*

In order to clarify the national legal framework about housing policies we must divide our considerations between the different regulation fields, which have a major impact on housing.

##### *1.1.1. Planning Laws and Development of new Public housing*

In Italy planning regulation system is still set by a law of sixty years ago (1159/1942), which choose Urban General Plan as the main policy tool to regulate urban development. Urban General Plan decides the amount and quality of built environment to develop on every public and private land plot inside the municipal border. Even if the rules of development established by the Urban General Plan apply equally on public and private land, the general urban law of 1942 foresaw a great space for compulsory expropriation of land, without defining a public land regime. Still today the Italian State acquire estates at market prices with a law of the Bourbon State, rearranged in 1992. This law set the rate of compensation of compulsory expropriation at around 60% of market price, which is still too much for the average Italian municipal budget. This is a crucial point because municipalities never had enough resources to develop housing on public land.

In the immediate second world war aftermath development of social housing was at a national scale. Both social rental housing (with a scheme coordinated by a State Institute of Insurance INA) and Incentives to own-property housing, through which the State supported middle class people in creating cooperatives developing their own housing (a law called Tupini by the name of its proponent), were at a national scale. Public housing should have been built (according to a law of almost twenty years later 167/63) inside public housing neighborhoods on public land acquired by the State. Resources to develop the public housing were still national. There was a national fund (Gescal) in fact realized with a little fiscal withdrawal on profits and wages. Two laws of the seventies (865/1971 and 457/78) laid down the procedures for land expropriation for the building of new public housing and transferred national funding for housing to the local level. Without resources and a favourable land expropriation regime it had been quite difficult until then for Municipalities to plan public housing. After the new laws, for the first time, not only it was financially sustainable to expropriate land in order to plan public housing, but Municipalities were in charge of realizing public housing by their local Institutes of social housing (IACP). While the last wave of development of public housing was already in course of realization, four years later in 1982, the Constitutional Court declared invalid the law n 457/78. The impossibility to develop further public housing put an end to a season in which the role of public actors in housing policies was considered to be the development of new public housing. Actual public housing is managed by

regional agencies, which are the evolution of IACP and have the autonomy to decide the criteria according to which public housing is provided. Usually these criteria are: income, serious physical and mental disease and largeness of households.

New laws at the beginning of the nineties (142/1990) re-designed responsibilities of local authorities. Even if Italy still miss a proper public national land regime, Municipalities are able to negotiate with private developers agreements, outside a national framework, in which private developers are allowed to build contributing to the realization of a variable amount of public services. Beside to this possibility a new generation of urban policy tools were created. These are fully comparable to the same policy tools created abroad for Urban Regeneration. PRU (plan of urban recovery) PRUSST (plan of sustainable urban recovery) CQ (neighbourhood's agreement), and others. These policy tools should be distinguishable by three features: not-large scale intervention, multidimensional intervention, integration with other kind of urban projects.

### *1.1.2 Rental Market Law and vouchers*

In Italy Rental Market is regulated at the national level. Since 1992 housing are rented at entirely free market prices, the length of the contract is four years, which could be renovated for another four years. Rental market was regulated before by so-called Fair Rent Act (law 392/1978), which was a national law which linked the rent to the state of repair of an apartment. Since the inhabited buildings in the historical centres of Italian cities were in bad repair, the rents were also very low and many landlords took their properties off the rental market. As unintended consequence just after the approval a wave of evictions hit all the Italian housing market. This wave was particularly harsh in the cities with an old housing stock. The abolition of Fair Rent Act brought about immediately an increase in real estate prices, which rocketed more and more with the start of the Italian cycle of international financialization at the end of the nineties. In the meanwhile another law on rental market was approved to fill the lack of a comprehensive regulation hole started with the abolition of Fair Rent Act<sup>1</sup>. Beside to complete free market negotiations between landlord and tenant, this law established a contract whose renting prices was established according to the area of the city, by negotiations between landlord associations and tenants unions. The same law established a National Fund in order to support low income tenants to pay renting. This National Fund during the years was deprived of any resources. Today very few families in the rental market have access to some kind of financial support provided by a voucher paid with the resources of the National Fund, neither social services vouchers exist in any meaningful way. The consequences of the whole new pattern of regulation were a huge increase in the housing rental market prices (today a mortgage monthly payment is less expensive than renting) and an obvious increase in the rate of homeownership.

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
<sup>1</sup>From 1992 (year of the abolition of Fair Rent Act) to 1998 (year of the new law) Housing were freely rented at selfregulating prices due to a transitory regulation.

## 2. Social Policies

The process of devolution started in '70s have transferred more responsibilities to regional government<sup>2</sup> in terms of institutional legitimacy, legal power and authorities on own territories. This trend has continued during 90s through a progressive political and administrative decentralisation of competences toward local governments to manage local questions (health, social service, mobility, infrastructures, primary school, traffic policeman, etc).

In 2001 the Constitutional Reform Law<sup>3</sup> has attributed more legislative autonomy (any Regions can make own laws and set of rules) and has set up new principle called "subsidiarity" in order to the high institutional level (State or supranational organism) should support the low institutional level (Region, Province or City) and intermediate organisms (local institutions, families, parties, associations) in policy-making. Following Di Gaetano and Strom (2003:369) we can say the devolution is "centralized" because the central state maintains the role of Polity's coordinator and main provider of local public spending.

With regard to our case study, the regulation of several policy fields in Italy (included Housing and Social Policies), are regulated as follows:



However the mechanism is not just linear because legislative autonomy and institutional legitimacy decreed by law are not followed by financial autonomy in region and local governments. In fact the formulation of political agenda and municipal budget are not autonomous mechanisms. The first process is often directly linked to second since the local government's capacity to respond to collective needs of the community (house, public services, infrastructures, school) depend upon external factors as such as transfers from central state<sup>4</sup> and relative cuts in public spending (in the case of Social Policy), "private-interests" or "governing logic".

<sup>2</sup> In Italy the Region as Local Authority with own Statute birthed in 1970 following the norms and values set from Constitutional Charta – art. 114.

<sup>3</sup> It has revisited artt. 114, 117 and 118 of Constitutional Charta.

<sup>4</sup> For example In 2008 the 50% of the whole revenues of Genoa came from Regional and National Funds.

Since the '90s European Commission has entered in the framework showed above as an fundamental actor in mainstream of policy followed by Member States and by the European cities. On the one hand it establishes the binding objectives and the recommendations through which orients policy making (*Europeanization* - Scharpf 1997) and on the other it creates direct relations with institutional local levels. European Funds<sup>5</sup> and Programs<sup>6</sup> toward cities have provided a lot of opportunities to develop local economy and to recover the disadvantages (ex Objective 1 and Objective Convergence now) or to reform labour law, environmental protection, knowledge economy, etc...

This interrelation between inter-institutional levels (or called multi-level governance – Scharpf 2000; Marks and Hooghe 2003) has also influenced the urban governance both on the typology of policy fields which gets part in political agenda and on actors, interests and relations which play an important role in local policy making (Le Galès 1998; Pierre 2000).

Also in the case of Genoa, as we can see in this work-package, the governance responses product by local government in an shrinkage context and governance arrangements are not only influenced by the complex process of the change (economic, demographic, social, planning) and the (direct and indirect) impacts caused by shrinking, but overall they are influenced by system of institutional relations and dependences, political objectives, European mainstream, financing resources. These feauteres have led to local government to identify a new strategy and a new partners by which social and urban questions could be resolved (*public entrepreneurialism* for Housing Policy and *welfare community* for Cohesion Policy).

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<sup>5</sup> European Social Fund (ESF); European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); Cohesion Fund.

<sup>6</sup> Life; Tempus; VII Framework Program; Culture; Progress; URBAN; JASPERS, JEREMIE e JESSICA;

## Introduction

The process of shrinkage in the city of Genoa has brought about a profound process of urban and social change. One can hypothesise a causal temporal diagram (Fig. 1), in which (as already illustrated in the course of the first year of our research), the impact of the shrinkage divides itself into two main dimensions that can be synthesized into definitions of PLACE (or housing questions) and PEOPLE (ageing, poverty, segregation, immigration). The effects that shrinkage produces on the urban and social context manifest themselves at different times, intensity and with different responses on the part of the policy makers. Thus the report proposes to address two specific areas of policy (respectively *Housing and Urban Regeneration* and *Social Cohesion*), which we consider of extreme interest for an overall understanding the policies and governance that have been carried out by the city of Genoa in a context of shrinkage.

By Housing and Regeneration Policies we mean those policies that correspond to the housing needs of the inhabitants, which in the case of Genoa have become strictly interconnected with the process of improvement of the centre of the city, where there was a concentration of the rent-paying population and social disadvantage. These policies are quite representative of the pre-eminent role played by Public and semi-Public Institutions in urban governance. However, one should also state that the model for public action outlined in these policies cannot be taken as being universally representative. Not only between Housing and Regeneration policies, but also among the different regeneration actions it is possible to observe different models.

By Social Cohesion policy we refer to a range of policies and actions such as, access to services and amenities to all citizens; the improvement of social care and territorial services; active ageing; training and job opportunities for poor people; the provision of public spaces and social centres; favouring integration between social groups and between ethnic groups<sup>7</sup>.

We believe it could be useful to study the governance of shrinkage in Genoa and to include the policies enacted both by public actors and the private sector to improve the living conditions and well being of the populations (in particular those populations living in urban zones subjected to shrinkage). The implementation of social cohesion policy may entail analyzing in detail the capacity of governance to respond to urban questions by following an integrated approach (*pro-growth regeneration policy with welfare community-pro-equity*).


Our findings on governance arrangements and governance responses are articulated by decades in a diagram that relates the policy to the agency (annex 1). But for the first policy it has been possible to reconstruct the governance model for the last 30 years; in the second policy shrinkage only becomes a part of the agenda later (in the 1980's).<sup>8</sup>

Over a period of time shrinkage has had an indirect influence on the city, exercising a change more on the social actors and the underlying problems than on the political agenda. These changes have interacted with the profound changes of the *framework* of regulation, generating the evolution of urban governance.

### Figure 1 - Impacts, trajectories and policies of shrinkage

<sup>7</sup> See *Cohesion Policy and Cities: the urban contribution to growth and jobs in the regions* (COM 2006 385 – Bruxelles 13.7.2006)

<sup>8</sup> In the some *urban zones shrunk (Inner city, Cornigliano and Sampierdarena)* there is the formation of a specific social pattern (ageing, poverty, segregation, immigration, lack of social services, etc) that over the last 30 years has produced a series of social demands for assistance and services which only progressively entered the agenda of the local policy makers.



## 1. The impact of shrinkage on the selected policy area(s)

### 1.1 Housing and regeneration

For almost all of the 80's the issue of shrinkage was not part of the political agenda. Intuitively, one would think that a reduction of a population ought to immediately influence the availability of housing by the creation of vacancies. However, in practice this depends on a number of factors; the scope and length of the shrinkage, the building rate of new housing in the years before the shrinkage process started; and the condition of tenancy of the population. High levels of vacancies occur only in cases of massive and rapid shrinkage, while a gradual decrease, characterized by an ageing population may initially cause a redistribution of population density between areas.

In Genoa the reduction in population first hit the historical city center, one of the most densely inhabited urban areas in Europe, where much of the housing was in bad repair and most of the residents were tenants and could therefore be easily displaced. Since the over-crowding of the center was perceived as a problem, the issue was not the shrinkage in itself but the shortage of affordable housing.

The decrease of residents occurred in correspondence with a large wave of evictions caused by the new law regulating rents, (see national background), while on the hills on the fringes of the city several new public housing estates were planned. At the end of the '70s Regional and local governments were put in charge of developing new public housing as a result of a national law 457/78. The drop in the population was perceived as a too recent phenomenon, while the industrial crisis was already looming large as the main problem to face, and there was no clear perception of the level of intensity that shrinkage would assume in the following twenty years.

The housing shortage concentrated on how and where to develop the new public housing, not on alternatives of how to renovate the dilapidated buildings in the city center, or how to build on the city's former industrial area.

The alternative to avoid a new expansion of the city on the hillsides of Genoa was supported by a small group of intellectuals gathered around INU<sup>9</sup>, and in some sense by a small part of the IACP<sup>10</sup>, which since the end of the 70s had pressed for small-scale actions of regeneration inside the city center. But the leftist parties and tenants' unions strongly supported a rapid solution through new public housing, and the Construction Industry was also certainly interested in the possibility of receiving large contracts from the Municipality.

In the 90's the issue of shrinkage was much more evident, at least in the city center, because flats left empty by evicted Italian low income tenants were being rented on the black market to the first wave of international migrants, and drug dealing and new micro-criminal activities<sup>11</sup> spread all over the area, with larger intensity than before. Because of this degradation of the social environment residents from every part of the city urged Municipality to undertake a comprehensive action of regeneration. The objective was to "embellish" the centre.

Industrial and peripheral neighborhoods also experienced a drop in density, but it was not seen as a problem even because it contributed to less crowded areas for a residential population which was rapidly getting older and older, and it kept the cost of real-estate at a relatively low level. However, at the end of the 90s vacant properties in former working class neighborhoods dropped in number with the arrival of the second wave of international migrations.

In the last decade Genoa has experienced a great rise in the price of housing as a result of the national phenomenon of the longest real-estate market growth that Italy has seen in the last fifty years, and as a consequence of the renovation of the city centre. This sharp rise in housing prices created an urgent need for new affordable accommodation, while at the same time a huge amount of the housing was under-used.

The contemporary housing shortage derives from the prevalence of home ownership over tenancy. Elderly homeowner residents living alone often continue to occupy very large apartments, taking off flats from rental markets. Given the lack of national funding for the development of new public housing, a re-distributive approach through directly owned Municipal housing stock is no longer on the agenda. The assessment of the Municipal government is also, that the majority of those in need of housing would not want to live in public housing, if they are able to afford a rent a little under the market level.

Ageing was perceived for the first time in official studies as a burden to a regular housing supply.

## **1.2 Social Cohesion**

The progressive depopulation of some areas of the city and Genoa's industrial crisis, which began in the 70's and 80's, have together created the conditions in the city's historic centre for the emergence of disadvantage and isolation among the resident population (the elderly, single parent families, the unemployed and low income workers), as well as in other ex-industrial areas like Cornigliano and Sampierdarena.

These areas progressively began to be abandoned (during the 80's) and to lose their urban identity, and in the following years became the destination for foreign nationals and low income families who moved there for economic reasons (the lower cost of living). On this already fragile territory there supervened socio-economic events (evictions and house abandonment; the progressive closing of shops and commerce; the spread of drugs and dangerous activities; organized crime...) that contributed to a stratification of social demands.

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<sup>9</sup> The National Institute of Urbanism, a semi-public actor, whose mission is to study and to counsel on urban policies.

<sup>10</sup> The Municipal Institute of public housing.

<sup>11</sup> The centre has always been the location for black market activities and prostitution.

These factors contribute to making the years between the late 80's and early 90's of crucial significance in producing a complex social and urban context which in the following years will produce all its *negative manifestations*.

Throughout the 90's there occurs a concentration of the socially weaker strata of the population in the very areas that had once been the bulwark of the city's economy. The population is both "old-established" (the elderly and families already resident or born in Genoa; ex-port workers; the unemployed; the poor; underprivileged families etc); and "newly established" (foreigners, ethnic minorities, those seeking work, visiting port workers, prostitutes)<sup>12</sup>. These latter add to the social question, since they live on the city's periphery (often as illegal immigrants) and are employed on the black job market.

Thus, the social question that has formed over the last 30 years can be considered as one of the indirect consequences of depopulation, but it does not form part of the political agenda from the start, or rather structural intervention is not planned that sees shrinkage as a problem. The 80's do not in fact show a concern for the ageing of the population and *social decay* (as direct effects of shrinkage), and the socio-political action of those years is restricted to trying to combat poverty, or types of marginalisation through the coordination of social services by the Municipality (operating by sector and in response to emergencies).

For the ageing population the Municipality, together with the first forms of voluntary groups, planned the first services at home, but these were entirely fragmentary and had an aid-giving character. In the 80's the policy makers were also preoccupied with carrying out the great structural reforms of the social services in Italy (the shutting down of institutions such as insane asylums and orphanages), and with beginning to plan the first territorial services that did not stigmatise those who used them.

Over the 80's and 90's the new problems of social inclusion, urban segregation, spatial inequalities between neighbourhoods, segregation and social inequalities between different social and ethnic groups, the abandonment of buildings, low living conditions, progressive ageing with the aged living alone, the lack of services or job opportunities and forms of micro-criminality will all cause the political agenda of Genoa to take greater account of the social question, and to formulate an integrated system of social services connected with the real needs of the city.

The timeline diagram in Annexe 1, tries to schematise into periods the principal actions carried out by the Municipality over the decade in the respective areas of policy (housing and regeneration; Social Inclusion) and to relate them to the various stakeholders involved.

## **2. Governance arrangements in the case study area by selected policy area and changes as a result of shrinkage.**

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<sup>12</sup> In the same areas affected by these concentrations there is also a population with a high standard of living, and this generates the peculiar type of segregation present in some buildings in the historic centre of Genoa, whereby the lower floors are occupied by socially disadvantaged people, while the upper and penthouse apartments belong to the wealthy owners who reside in them.

## 2.1 Housing and regeneration

Genoa has a quite specific pattern in governance arrangements for housing and regeneration policies, because unlike most other European cities, private actors have played a small role in deploying strategies for housing and regeneration. Most of the crucial changes in last thirty years have been carried out by different public actors, rather than by partnerships between the public and private sectors, which is seen as the key relationship through which regeneration works in Anglo-Saxon contexts.

At the end of the '70s and at the beginning of the '80s there was a sort of unanimous convergence of opinion that Genoa should respond to the housing shortage by the development of new public housing. The centre for decision was the municipal government (then already composed of a centre-left coalition which was to govern the city to the present day).

Land-owners and Construction entrepreneurs did not need to push hard to influence the Municipality in this direction. There are several reasons for this; firstly the owners of land had never been as powerful a lobby as in other parts (for example in Rome) because in Genoa the availability of land to build on is very limited, and was almost completely used up in the decade immediately after the second world war. As a result real-estate development was forced to turn out towards the hills where land ownership has always been very fragmented.

Yet, there had once been construction companies of some substance in Genoa, into which part of the profits from maritime commerce were traditionally invested up to the end of the 80's. In a sense these companies were made powerless by the shrinkage, which made it evident that there was no longer the need or physical space for a new construction cycle like that of the '60s, which had used up almost all the available urban areas. Neither they were able to re-orient their core-markets from big scale development to small scale regeneration, nor most of construction firms recover from the crisis of 1992 induced by the big-bribery scandal, which exploded because of systemic corruption of local administrators in managing public works<sup>13</sup>.

As a natural consequence of the disappearance of these established local construction firms, new private firms from outside have subsequently appeared on the real-estate market. The best among the local firms acquired an expertise in renovation, while construction companies from outside were more interested in big redevelopment projects. The largest of these, originally developing from the left-wing cooperatives in the "red regions", has, since the end of the eighties, become one of the major construction companies. Being large enough to be involved in realizing large-scale projects and infrastructures, its interest was not strictly in housing, which is not currently seen as the core activity of the Liguria's branch of this firm. Nevertheless, it was to be involved in one major development project in a former industrial area (see the study case below), which is in part residential.

For what regards the multi-level governance of public actors, this was determined by the legal framework in operation at that time. In point of fact a law of 1978 had definitively established the responsibility of Regional Government for the planning, finance and development of public housing<sup>14</sup>. Regions also had the obligation to transfer the national funding dedicated to housing to the Municipality. The Municipality had the right to plan public housing and decide where and when development was to take place. Basically, lands where the Municipality was to construct public housing were acquired (or at least selected) by Municipalities in conformity to a National Law of 1963. Finally, the realization of projects was in charge of the IACP. According to the National law and Regional laws approved in 1983 the IACP was far more constrained into a role of simple

<sup>13</sup> This scandal known as "Tangentopoli" created an almost complete stop of public investment in residential and not residential infrastructures for several years.

<sup>14</sup> Even though the part of the law giving local governments the power to expropriate land at a price established by its rural value was set aside by the Constitutional Court in 1981.

execution. This new role of the Region constituted a decisive turn for the way Italian public housing was to be built.

In 1971 the regional government was less important in taking and orienting decisions on new public housing, because this had become a completely new institutional level. At that time the Institute of Municipal public housing (IACP) had been characterized by a certain autonomy. Later, a conflict between institutional actors began not only for the decision of the location of public housing, but on general management and the financial budget of the municipal housing stock. The IACP entered into conflict with the Municipality and the Region. Later, in 1986, financial burdens were imposed on the Institute in order to correct a budget deficit and its management (which was chosen by the Regional government) was replaced, the number of Institute's staff was diminished by half, a part of the housing stock was privatized, and higher rents were imposed on tenants on the basis of income.

The central actor of housing policies was therefore the Municipality, who definitively chose how the new public housing was to be developed. There was a general consensus among the political parties, and the decision was also quite popular at a social level. Consortium of building entrepreneurs (CIGE), who realized the buildings, was looking for business that was larger than that of a small-scale renovation of the historic centre, while the Tenants Union had little faith in the long and laborious procedures for the renovation of the historical buildings. It cannot be said that someone was against the development of new public housing. Not even the IACP management of the late '70s, who struggled to realize some succeeding experiences in supplying new public housing through renovation rather than through development of new built stock. It was the first time that a public housing plan had been managed entirely by a group of local planners, and this fact generated huge enthusiasm among the whole of Genoa's planning milieu.

Since that time, one can say that no major political conflict in the city has arisen over housing issues, and that the attitude of the main Tenant Union (Unione Inquilini) has been extremely collaborative and even one of active support for the policies chosen by the City Officials. This joint handling of housing policies (unions used to have and still have today a help-desk to inform people applying for public housing or to report the demand for public housing tenants) has been influenced by the continuity that left-wing political parties have maintained in the government of the city. Among the members of the municipal government it is quite common to find former tenants' group leaders or leaders of workers' unions.

The principal actor has been the Municipal government, and with regards to the development of new public housing on the hills it might be defined as being almost the only actor. The relationship with the other public actors can be described as being instrumental or executive and, for what regards the IACP, instrumental or of conflict (as long as IACP refused to come under stricter control of the Municipality).

There have been few conflicts, even inside the Municipal Council, and a consensus has characterized decisions since the beginning, both on the part of business and civil society. Instead, the way in which this project was realized created some dissatisfaction.

By the end of the eighties the situation had, in any case, changed completely. The new Urban plan was approved in 1984 and it basically stopped the massive construction of new residential housing, both private and public, also in view of the lack of a significant demand. In 1998 the region changed the IACP into a regional Agency (ARTE) with the mission of managing and maintaining the current stock of public housing. With this change the former IACP obtained a greater responsibility in respecting the financial burdens of the budget.

Meanwhile, the need to regenerate the city centre (see above) as directed by the Urban Plan had urged all the actors to do something concrete. The Municipality remained as the main actor, but an important role was also played by the Port Authority, and by other new organs.

In this change a new national legal framework coexisted with a lack of financial resources needed to accomplish the tasks of regeneration as indicated by the New Urban Plan. The general scheme was not the one described for developing new public housing. To realize all the ideas of regeneration planned in the old Urban Plan (which provided for the transformation of six areas of the city centre) there was no specific funding provided by Central Government.

Regional institutions approved a law at the very end of the eighties, and as a result a regional agency dedicated to urban regeneration ARRED was created. The agency did not have access to independent funds, but promotes private/public partnerships and offers services to private developers.

The differences between the governance approach of complex urban programmes and public construction are evident. The first difference is that even from a formal point of view this projects should start on initiative of a private proposal, it was the Municipality almost in any case to play the central role. On six PRU (the main complex programme) made in Genoa 4 were in the inner-city and one beside to it. The ones placed in the medieval centre were embedded in a broader action of regeneration promoted by the Municipality. The second difference is that while one off restoration work is financed with *ad hoc* funding, the whole flux of resources calculated for the urban regeneration derived from extemporary funding, or the success with which the Municipality could compete for funding in public competitions. Not only public finances were serendipitous but they represented just 31% of the whole amount of resources employed in regeneration actions. Therefore many regeneration action would have not been possible without private investments. Contribution to public facilities were required to a various extent to private developers involved in the regeneration projects. Private investments of course were allowed to put on the market housing renovated as such. That means that particularly in Genoa complex programmes had a serious impact on housing supply providing some hundreds of flats which could be considered before as dilapidated and unsuitable to be occupied. Most of them of course being renovated by private capitals were offered just below market prices (during the 00s at their upper level). The ones listed above are the main features of the complex programmes which characterize Italian urban policies since the half of the 90s.

The Centre of Genoa has experienced each of these different types of project, and to give a unity to the wide range of different actions, a specific office for the regeneration of the historic centre was created at the Department of Urbanism of the Municipality of Genoa.

In addition to these initiatives we must add a kind of project for urban regeneration produced by the Region for the small historic centres in the rural province (Voi), and the URBAN projects of the EU. In every one of these projects the Municipality has had to negotiate with proprietors of the apartments, who generally in the other areas of the historic centre were extremely fragmented. Other areas of the historic centre were restored using special mixed regional and national funding, and on the occasion of the G8 Summit in Genoa, also by asking the inhabitants to contribute. In these cases the residents would often gather in Street Committees (as in Via S.Lorenzo) for the purpose of negotiating the amount and the instalments for the incentives to pay for the renovation of buildings, which they would then carry out themselves. In at least two areas (S.Donato and Prè/Balbi) the university played an active part by not only contributing to the general planning of the projects, but by requesting new plots for student housing.

### *The case of Ancient Port*

*The regeneration of the Porto Antico (Ancient Port) followed yet another model. The restoration of the old pier had been a strategic objective since the 80's, and is why Renzo Piano (a world-wide celebrated architect, who is himself from Genoa) had been appointed to coordinate the project.*

*The regeneration project did not include any residential units but created a series of extraordinary services and facilities dedicated to tourism and urban leisure (upon the model of what was just realized in Baltimore). An essential element in it been the exchange between the Municipality and the Port Authority, who made a free contribution of the area of the pier. For the realization of the project a specific company was created (Società del Porto Antico) owned by the Municipality, the Regione and the Port Authority. When this company obtained the concession of the area within a perspective for further investments during the mid 90's, the Chamber of Commerce joined as the second major partner, while the Region left the company. The Port Authority was no longer interested in the area for navigational purposes, given the impossibility of trans-shipment, and in return received facilitations from the Municipality for the ongoing construction of the port at Voltri to the west. Also the society in charge of the realization of the executive project was a State-owned firm from Genoa (Italimpianti). Having only one partner to deal with facilitated procedures, but it is clear that that partner was a state-owned firm because it was a nation interest project financed with the money of a big event (the expo for the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of America's discovery). The model of governance could be therefore described as a negotiation among big-size public actors, with their roots in Genoa.*

Since 2000, and in the course of the production the new Urban Plan, the processes of improvement in other areas of the historic centre have continued. The second round of European Urban programme was used all over the city centre area, joining the other Italian urban complex programmes. In the area of housing policies the Municipality has sought further alliances (with Banks, Homeowners' Associations, real estate Associations) to offer atypical housing policies as alternatives to the construction of new public housing. The idea is to offer low cost rental housing through the investments in properties or developing new housing, in order to supply a social housing more expensive than the public housing of the '70s. Until now the involvement of private actors has not been successful. The only subjects available to offer their properties at a moderate cost have been until now Public Pension Institute and other Local authorities. Another idea involving the private sector has been a scheme for the creation of a Social Rental Agency whereby major proprietors are convinced to put their apartments on the rental market at below cost in return for garancies upon tenants payments. These operations continue to be managed by the old offices of the Department of Urbanism of the Municipality of Genoa, while the elaboration of the new Urban Plan has generated a new office on a semi autonomous level (Urban Lab).

## **2.2 Social Cohesion**

With regard to the social question a *policy arena* opens up and sees the participation of different actors. The fragility and social isolation that characterised the historic centre of Genoa made it stand out as a genuine “social laboratory” for the city. The social demand showed itself here, before it did elsewhere, in the manifestations of ageing, poverty and isolation; and it was here, too, that the social services of the Municipality experimented with the first forms of direct assistance to the public (*social services on the street*) in collaboration with the NGOs which already present. It has been possible to identify a specific policy and governance arrangement for each decade considered. By again following the Timeline Diagram (Annex1) we have tried to identify the key actors (or institutional thickness) that have participated in the different actions of governance over the last 30 years in a local context of shrinkage.

The responses on the part of the institutions had begun in the 80's, but has already been said, their attention had been directed to addressing the problem of poverty and social exclusion, and only subsequently that of ageing and the integration of the immigrants (Annex 3). These problems were addressed both by the social services of the Municipality of Genoa, for the first time on a territorial basis, and by religious voluntary groups that had been forming in some parishes of the historic centre (Religious Community San Benedetto, Religious Community San Marcellino, Caritas Diocesana) and in other shrunk areas (Don Bosco Parish Church at Sampierdarena and the Religious Community Francescani at Cornigliano). The action of support and primary services (refectories, dormitories, reception communities, door to door assistance) were directed at the poor, the aged living in run-down buildings or apartments too large and unequipped for their disabilities, the unemployed, vagrants, victims of prostitution, and especially at the addicts who had multiplied in the 80's as a result of the huge drug trafficking that had developed in the historic centre<sup>15</sup>.

Alongside the religious voluntary groups, the first lay voluntary associations and organisations began to spread in the form of parents with disabled or drug-dependent offspring who came together, forming a network community and self-help groups. Both were spontaneous forms of solidarity and assistance between citizens, and over the last 20 years they have constantly evolved in structure, now have full recognition as social entities (e.g. Auxilium – the Caritas Foundation), or have formed consortiums of cooperatives (Agorà, Confcooperative and LegaCoop). These actors are now seen as privileged interlocutors in the planning and execution of services and assistance to individuals.

The collaboration and shared running between the social services of the Municipality and the third sector, which includes religious voluntary associations, has always been active, but in forms, intensity and organization that have developed over time (Annex 3).

Up to the 80's the collaboration between the two had been little, had aimed at specific services (the disabled, old people living alone, large families) and was regulated by special agreements between the two parties. In those years there had developed a preliminary academic debate on the social question of Genoa and on its depopulation, but these issues did not get into the institutional agenda. Nevertheless, over the decade important changes were made in the social services that arose out of a reformist climate associated to the Left. It is in this context that certain important Genoese community leaders began to put forward new ideas and strategies<sup>16</sup>. The Institutions and the promotional campaigns of these community leaders, the years of pressure from progressive social operators, from the families of those requiring support and local citizens' groups, all favoured the introduction of the first forms of assistance at home (putting a stop to the hospitalisation or institutionalisation). In this way the first CAD (Centres for Assistance at Home) appeared distinguished by a marked integration of social and health services and the social right of the individual to receive the services at home. Also in those years there was the signing of the first agreements between the social services of the Municipality and the Cooperatives, specifically for the provision of assistance at home and for the management of the residential communities and Social Centres (first phase of externalisation).

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<sup>15</sup> The phenomenon of drugs in the city of Genoa is an aspect of great importance, since it was to focus many of the energies and resources made available by the Social Services and voluntary groups on the fight against addiction. During our interviews an operator spoke of a sort of 'welfare' role delegated to the rehab Communities that emerged in those years through the action of certain parish priests.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example the work of promotion and legitimatisation of social work carried out by the famous Mario Calbi, who served as Alderman of Social Policy for the Municipality of Genova from 1976 to 1985 with the first left-wing administrations; and that of Don Gallo of the Religious Community San Benedetto, who became a veritable 'national institution' in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, placing 'the individual' at the centre of the social service rather than the assistance.

Up to the end of the 90's there was a fertile period for reforms and legislation on local government that would also have an influence on the management model for the social services. The decentralisation of the institutions begins (Law 142/ 90; leggi Bassanini) by transferring responsibility for the management of social services to the local authorities. This trend of State devolution means transferring administrative authority and functional responsibility from higher to lower level of government (Brenner 2000).

From the middle of the 90's, also in conformity to laws for the social sector<sup>17</sup>, social policy in Genoa begins projects, interventions and actions to break the social isolation and decline by furnishing the territory with services for primary assistance offered at home, integrating social services, health care and socio-educational needs.

From the mid 90's onwards the transformation of the social demand, the rapid ageing of the population and the increase of immigrants living in disadvantaged conditions brought about a strengthening of the collaboration between public actors, and private or independent social operators. In those years the public services were affected by a serious shortfall in staff and funding, due to the cuts in the national funding for social spending by the Municipalities. This gave rise to the ever more frequent recourse to out-contracting to the third sector (NGOs). A Register was instituted at the Region for accredited non-profit associations (called ONLUS) with which the Municipality had established service-providing agreements (assistance at home for single or non-independent elderly people, and for the disabled; help desks for primary assistance; listening services to deal with problem prevention etc.)

The mainstream EU policies (European Employment Strategy-1997, followed by the Lisbon Strategy, 2000), oriented towards the promotion of social inclusion, positive employment levels, and society of knowledge influenced the objectives of local social policies [...].

Thus, the 90's set the seal on the transition from a social policy of traditional type (by sector and assistance providing) to one oriented towards the planning and realisation of integrated social services destined to maintain an open relationship between user and public authorities and to try to find more personalised and sensitive solutions that are close to socio-territorial needs.

Finally, over the last decade the system of social services has faced a further period of reform which has been in substance for the purpose of regulating a system of social services that had been integrated between public and private sectors over the preceding ten years. The regional government, after the national Law reforming social policies (law 328/2000) and after the reform of Titolo V of the Constitution, has made a change in local legislation for its social services: Regional Law 12/2006 on the *Improvement of socio-sanitary integrated system*; it has approved the *Socio-sanitary Integrated Plan 2007-2010* and the *Regional Fund for non-independent people (main elderly people)*.

The regional government through this legislation has selected the Socio-sanitary Districts<sup>18</sup>, with which it has direct financial dealings. It is within these that the new Social Territorial Ambits (called ATS) are then identified. These are areas that can cover more than one Municipality, but which group together to operate the basic social services<sup>19</sup>. The main objective is to build a *welfare community* and give greater recognition to the role of civil society and the third sector.

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<sup>17</sup> Law 321/89 in recognition of assisted health residences (RSA) as modern forms of residence for the elderly, the handicapped and other non self-sufficient persons; Law 266/91 is the reference law for the voluntary sector; Law 381/91 on social cooperatives; Law 162/90 on drug dependence; Law 216/91 on prevention and control of juvenile crime; Law 104/92 on the handicapped; Law 40/98 on immigration from the EU; Law 285/97 on support for the rights of children and adolescents.

<sup>18</sup> These are territorial areas made up of one or more Municipality and the respective Local Health Authority (called ASL).

<sup>19</sup> In the case of Genoa there are 9 ATS, one in each of the Districts into which the city is divided. Each District has own administrative executive but they must follow Guideline and Policy Strategy of Local Government of Genoa.

The Regional government thus takes full responsibility in areas of social policy<sup>20</sup> and receives from central government an annual part-funding from the National Fund for Social Policy.

In 2000 the Municipality of Genoa began the redaction of the new plan for social services known as the *Social Planning 2008-2010* which, while it contains a valid analysis of the city's social needs<sup>21</sup>, represents a formal document of a plan produced by the Municipality, with very little participation on the part of the Districts.

The middle years of the last decade saw the consolidation of the relationship between public institutions and the third sector. This was both the result of the current legislation (principle of horizontal subsidiarity), and of political demands at the regional government (Alderman Costa) and at the Municipality (Alderman Veardo). These elements combined strongly to favour forms of co-management of many forms of social services and assistance by means of *ad hoc* funding for special and innovative projects addressed directly to the Socio-sanitary Districts or the cooperatives.

During our interviews this arrangement was referred to as being a 'para-public third sector' that co-manages the planning and functioning of an integrated system of personalised social services in the city of Genoa<sup>22</sup>.

This question has been one of the subjects most debated during the interviews. The evaluations made by the stakeholders are split between those who see in this process of collaboration with the third sector as being the realization of the principle of horizontal subsidiarity<sup>23</sup>, and those who are more critical of this form of delegation of welfare services to private social institutions.

At all events, if we try to ascribe to each stakeholder an area of competence we can say that local welfare is subdivided into two areas:-

- a *lightweight welfare* formed of personal services, social care, social centres and services to prevent social exclusion for poor people, for outcasts; consultancy ...
- a *structural welfare* engaged in financial assistance (subsidies and vouchers) and support services at home for non-independent and disabled people.

In the first case there is a circle of both lay and religious voluntary social actors who have always functioned as an 'warning bell' for the territory, providing direct services either autonomously (the Catholic ones) or through an agreement with the Municipality. In both cases what emerges from the interviews is the existence of a rapport between public and private social operators that is also informal and made up of a network of people who have been active for a number of years in the area of Genoa, and who know and communicate with each other (by meetings, monthly assemblies, telephone, emails..).

In the second case operate the organisations that are strongest on the territory such as AUSER (a network of solidarity and voluntary assistance for active ageing); the Agorà Consortium (made up of 15 cooperatives); and the various ONLUS (non-profit associations) present in the city (Il Cesto; L'Aquilone...). To these are added the numerous, and by now capillary voluntary activities carried out by the Catholic voluntary groups such as Auxilium (Foundation of Caritas); Comunità di San Marcellino al Porto; Comunità di San Benedetto, etc.

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<sup>20</sup>In Italy this articulation of responsibilities is denominated 'vertical subsidiarity' among institutional levels (State Region and Local government)

<sup>21</sup> The analysis has been carried out by the University of Genoa, Anthropological Science Department in Education Science faculty (with the participation of Prof. Palumbo).

<sup>22</sup> A clarification is necessary on the channels for funding from the public sector; while in the case of lay institutions and voluntary associations public funding is indispensable, religious forms of social assistance carry out their actions using independent funds.

<sup>23</sup> The Social Policy Reform (L. 328/2000) expressly encourages forms of collaboration between the social services and the third sector associations. The technical term is "horizontal subsidiarity". For further information about subsidiarity see the *White Paper on Governance*, European Commission, 2001.

In response to this strong consolidation between the public and third sector, the approach of the Alderman for Social Policy currently in the Municipality indicates that the next objective will be to increase the responsibilities of the Public social services, which in recent years appear to have essentially only had a role in planning and coordination. While preserving stable relations with The third sector (through specific formal agreements), the objective of the Alderman is that of “retaking control of the operational process and monitoring more closely the distribution of the services”, rather than delegating welfare functions to private social welfare (*it seems a stop to the delegation of welfare*).

### **3. Governance responses to the problems in the selected policy field(s) caused by shrinkage**

#### **3.1 Housing and Regeneration**

The approach adopted by governance has always been that of a public managerialism<sup>24</sup> that was to become a public pro-growth entrepreneurialism, with an open eye to social sustainability. This approach has not changed over the decades; what has changed is the role and power of the main public actor (the Municipality), and as a consequence of the efficacy and the effects of this strategy. While it is true that the centre Left has uninterruptedly governed the city for the past 30 years, it is possible to find styles of governance and strategies that are peculiar to each decade. Even considering just the last fifteen years some actors interviewed complain about a rupture in the attention to regeneration projects under the government of last Mayor.

During the 80's a general Plan was in elaboration, that was inspired by the re-launching of the city and gave great importance to the restoration of the city centre.

In the 70's the IACP was convinced that they were supplying new public housing through the renovation and regeneration of the historic centre rather than by producing new social housing estates, and in 1976 it produced two small public housing projects within the city centre (Salita Prione e Via Del Colle), and realized the joint objectives of regenerating two WWII bomb sites and providing social housing. An important developer questioned about that defined the project as a “total failure”, because it lacked of a proper commercial part, nonetheless the Municipality had been stimulated by this work, and on the specific request of the Regional government, had produced (in collaboration with the University) a plan for the historic centre (SOI) within the general plan. This plan for the centre provided general guidelines for actions to develop in 6 specific areas (any of these areas of an extension between 1,5 and 2 hectares) of the historic centre, and in some cases also detailed actions were designed. The main outlines of this strategy were not carried out until the 90's, prevalently by public funding, and with the new modalities of complex programs.

The firms in Genoa were mainly large State metalworking corporations who were unlikely to be interested in the large scale urban regeneration of the historic centre that mainly represented the recovery of the tourism sector. The only regeneration work conducted by one of these historic city firms was the construction of the Fiumara (middle class residences built around a large shopping centre) on a site located between Cornigliano e Sampierdarena previously belonging to Ansaldo, who had been keen to increase its income from this ex-industrial site for the construction of its new central facility.

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<sup>24</sup> We specify that, with this term we do not mean a governance style similar to that one described by the school of new public management

### *Study case Housing and Regeneration: La Fiumara in Cornigliano*

*An example of a model of governance shaped by the long-lasting history of Genoa as an industrial city. The building of the commercial centre, La Fiumara, and the residential complexes that have grown up around it followed a governance-design in which the planning by the Municipality was influenced by the interests of the State-owned company, Ansaldo. Ansaldo invested more than 350 millions of euro against just the 9 millions of euro made available by the Municipality<sup>25</sup>. The project foresaw a commercial centre and up to 9 tower of residential and directional spaces, but eventually expelled the location for the Faculty of Engineering. This was the final mark to underline that the area, notwithstanding the opinion of many actors, would not have been any more a productive place, not even devoted to technology. A techno pole is now under construction around Erzelli (an hill just above La Fiumara) after having attracted foreign direct investments of the ICT Ericson. The Ansaldo's interests in turn coincided with those of a large construction company, Coopsette, which benefits from a privileged relationship with political elites historically at the head of the local government. The relationship between this firm and the local regional and municipal government has been shaped in a broad sense by affiliation to the same political area. According to some accounts collected during our interviews, the main actor in the relationship between this firm and the Municipality has not always been the public authority, since it is easy for the management to negotiate directly with the national establishment of left-wing political parties. Ansaldo needed an increase in land rent from the ex-industrial property it owned to reinvest the profit in the construction of a new central facility. The effecting of this property operation represented a big business opportunity for the large construction company, Coopsette, who would then easily become a part of the city's growth coalition, but had been unable to undertake large residential development operations as a result of the demographic decline. The priorities of Ansaldo in the end played a decisive role, and the project was completed, in spite of numerous criticisms from public opinion of the city.*

*This operation was the last case of an urban transformation of this type by governance. The loss of jobs in many public industrial sectors distracted State attention from Genoa, where the infrastructures were no longer of any use to the majority of workers.*

*Meanwhile the large companies who preserved their central interests in the Genoa area were those tied to the transport and maritime commerce, and are by definition trans-national companies, whose concern for a post-industrial city is restricted to the efficiency of its port and logistic activities. In this case urban transformations required by the enterprises would be big investment in highways to improve multi modal connections between the port and truck transport, but In addition, with modern technology the running of trans-shipment in a port is no longer a labour intensive activity, and well able to adapt to a demographically stagnant city.*

During the 80's, instead, the agenda had concentrated on the building of new residential areas on the hills, rather than on the restoration of the centre. The approach was to privilege and prioritise redistribution in the form of supplying public housing. These apartments were in fact allotted on the basis of income, size of family and whether one had been evicted, and this position had won a widespread consensus.

The housing shortage was indeed severe, and the Municipality was not able to halt a long series of evictions carried out by small landlords; meanwhile the renovation of private historical buildings

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<sup>25</sup> We must specify that even if Ansaldo captured a meaningful increase of land rent from the project, public facilities of the new neighbourhood grown up around the commercial centre were paid for the 75% by Ansaldo itself.

was rare because of the strict regulation by the National planning laws that had been formulated to preserve the original structure of the ancient Italian city centre.

Out of this came the idea to build what were to be the last areas of public housing for a very high density of residents, on the basis of the typical European models for popular residential areas. These were the last large scale interventions in popular building, after which Arte and Arredo have only carried out demolition and reconstruction work on public housing<sup>26</sup>.

Awareness of the low demand for accommodation from inhabitants also caused the no- realisation in some areas of the density envisaged by the original plans. This awareness had been missing at the time of planning. The size of the apartments built in the new social housing areas was also significantly greater than that of the Genoese family that would be living in them a few years later.

This favoured the occupation of the buildings by many families of foreigners after the initial restructuring had been done. Many of the buildings proved to be unsuited for proper living and did not generate the level of community life present in the historic centre, from which many of the inhabitants had come; and so some modifications were made to the newly-constructed buildings.

Certainly the approach of the Administration to respond to housing needs and to seek a balanced form of urban development by means of its own direct ownership of housing stock came to an end in the 90's.

The Municipality sold almost all its housing stock that was not managed through Arte. It existed in fact a large part of the Municipality's direct ownership, which had come through various channels (donations, inheritances, auctions etc.). This part of the patrimony was managed by a special Committee of the MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, which did not allocate by public application, but on the basis of rather unclear criteria. This situation brought about a second and particularistic public action constituted with the apartments owned by the Municipality, aside from the realisation of a distributive approach through public action represented by the public housing that had been built by IACP/ARTE,. In practice, politicians used the allocation of these latter apartments as a means of exchange and to take care of particular categories (above all, the staff of the Municipality itself).

Privatisation put a stop to this use of public property, consenting home-ownership to a middle class level of prevalently public employees. It was never part of the agenda to re-utilise these funds deriving from the sales in the purchase of a new stock of housing at a low cost (which was then still abundant in the historic centre).

The Municipality's efforts had thus concentrated on the regeneration of some of the points specified by the restoration plan for the historic centre, and of other areas renovated by partaking in a variety of Ministerial and European funding, as we have seen above. These projects varied according to who was financing the work, the type of project (with or without actions for social inclusion), and the scale of implementation.

### *Study case Housing and Regeneration: Prè*

*For the first urban regeneration project of the historic centre (the Prè area) the Municipality was thus obliged to present a project that also included social housing, and to apply for Ministerial funds through allocation procedures similar to those of the EU<sup>27</sup>. The first Prè project, realized through Ministerial funding for experimental building, had planned the restoration of no longer usable buildings and their transformation into social housing for particular categories (public*

<sup>26</sup> Some current building renovation plans concern those very areas that had been constructed in the 80's.

<sup>27</sup> Law 25/1982; Law 194/1983.

employees, police personnel, student accommodation etc.). These initiatives tended to draw into the historic centre social categories who, while not rich, had escaped the trap of unemployment/low income and had the spending power for the numerous cultural services and entertainments that were opening up in Genoa in the 90's.

During the 80's, at the time of the evictions and urban decline, a single private large real estate company (Compagnia San Gallo) bought up almost all the apartments in the area. This company was a consortium of medium-size firms from the City. Most of them used to realize their profit by the execution of public works. These Construction firms Consortium, speculating on future regenerations, bought up an entire part of the city centre (Prè) at a rock bottom price. The idea was to wait for the regeneration plan to be put in act, since it was known that Prè as dilapidated area in consequence of the bombings of WWII should have been re-build. In order to proceed without negotiating with this Consortium the Municipality was forced to expropriate and the procedure in addition to making the negotiations with the company longer, exhausted the funds from the Municipality while the money from the Ministry turned out to be too few. In the meanwhile the firms of the Consortium went bankrupt, and was the local bank (Carige) to sold finally the buildings to the Municipality. When another consortium of construction firms was given the responsibility to execute the project another kind of conflict raised because the money remained was too few to realize the whole spectrum of technical experiments foreseen by the initial project.

This helped to keep the apartments empty for a long time, allowing their occupation by the first wave of foreign immigrants. In the middle of the nineties the death of a migrant in the collapse of one of the squatted building occurred urging the Municipality to make faster the process of renovation. What's more over the 90's the Italian urban policies changed as the Ministry began to create a series of specific funds for the renovation of buildings and integrated initiatives for housing and social policies<sup>28</sup>. Some of this project (Urban and Pru) were used in financing the renovation of the public spaces of the whole area. Lately particular attention was dedicated to the small retail shop. Commercial spaces at the basements for the residential buildings involved in the project were in fact created and renovated for an half, then rented to the self-employed shop-owners who completed the structures according to their business needs, and started their activities. This case is particularly compelling in representing some of the points crucial to the regeneration process of the whole historic city centre.

- First: a governmental style oriented to public-property is ended with the production of public housing and it is not possible without a favourable land regime, therefore the inspiration of new urban policy tools is oriented towards a public-private partnership
- Second: The scale of the project must be small, because of the lack of public resources which -notwithstanding the private-public partnership- must have the role of starter in the project
- Third: After the buildings were compulsory acquired by the Municipality, it was possible to use it as public housing and rent them to disadvantaged families but lower middle class families were chosen to live them.

**Figure 2 - Number of blocks renovated in Prè**

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<sup>28</sup> These were the PRU and PRUSST funds for the restoration of urban infrastructures and the Contratti di Quartiere for the rehabilitation and social support of the degraded city areas.



For some of the groups in operation (PRU/PRUSST) there is no need for premises, as they essentially operate on former industrial areas or dilapidated public spaces on limited scale, and are quite similar to other European policy tools<sup>29</sup>. Sometimes private construction firms had the chance to put on private market part of the residential stock they renovated through Regeneration project. The cost of renovation was in part covered by the Municipality, therefore the price at which renovated housing stock was eventually sold was a little bit under average market price. Since that time market prices were rising very fast, it was a sort of game, where everyone reached their task. Middle classes families had the chance to buy a renovated flat in the city centre at a reasonable (even if not affordable for everyone) price, construction firms had the chance to supply housing in the city centre at a price enough high to gain a market profit and enough low (thanks to the contribution of Municipality) to have easily a large demand. The Municipality placed middle class families in order to upgrade socially the central area. With regard to the other complex projects groups (Contratti di Quartiere), that try to become involved in the social dimension of regeneration, these have increased housing supply and have planned housing initiatives for the disadvantaged. In the last of the actions carried out (Ghetto) there is the plan for the recovery of a building owned by the Church, which has granted some rooms, but reserved others for the creation of accommodation for single mothers.

In other areas the Municipality has been mainly involved in the renewal of primary urban services (roads, drains etc), and in offering incentives to residents for the renovation of the fronts of their buildings by mixed funding. Among the projects receiving European funding, Urban stands out for its scale, which covers the entire historic centre, and for the way it blends in with previously completed social interventions.

The project for the renovation of the water front has from the start been modelled on substituting its past industrial and economic character with prestigious facilities and services able to attract tourists (congress centres, panoramic lift, the largest aquarium in Europe). Set back from the front, service infrastructures for the whole city have subsequently been renovated (e.g. The Faculty of Economia e Commercio). Other restorations are planned for the last section of the Old Pier, again for the provision of central services, and under the supervision of prestigious architects.

<sup>29</sup> Except for the fact that there is no quangos to manage the projects.

Apart from pursuing projects of urban regeneration, in recent years some measures have been taken to control the housing market with the aim of offering non-public housing at a rent price that is in the middle below the market value and above that of public housing. The Regional (38/1997) law gave the chance to the Municipalities of Liguria to impose construction firms a share of 10% of low-cost housing on the newly developed residential stock. This share is economically sustainable for firms profit just when real estate market is booming otherwise landowners who are allowed to build by the Urban General Plan can delay their investments. That's why this mechanism did not work well.

A social rental agency has been created with the participation of landlords' associations, estate agents and banks to bring together landlords prepared to let their apartments at a reduced rent that is guaranteed by the Municipality in case of default by the tenant. This has been followed by a proposal for social housing by public application on the basis national legislation, but the applicants have been exclusively from the public sector.

### 3.2. Social Cohesion

As we have said, the responses to the social question and the creation of a governance that is active on the problems of social inclusion started with some delay.

At the beginning of the 80's the first services of assistance at home began, as did the first forms of participation in social policies by citizen and voluntary groups. The intention was that of overcoming the rigid categorisation of the end users. This was entirely experimental, since the 80's represent a decade of transition during which the social services of the Municipality (including health services) were reorganised in a capillary manner to lay the foundations for the first agreements between the public, private and third sector.

As we have seen, the legislative framework of the last 30 years for social services is extremely complex and many of the laws have the character of a thoroughgoing reform and reorganisation of the system of social welfare on the basis of local governance (the territory, integration of policies, participation by civil society, joint planning of services by private and public stakeholders).

In order to understand the dynamics through which the social system of cohesion policies develops one must specify that in Italy they have often represented "marginal policies" within a family-based welfare model that attributes many of the care functions to the family (in particular to women). This approach united with a Catholic culture has given rise to a welfare based on charity and solidarity rather than on rights<sup>30</sup>.

As the years passed, however, the local and national policy makers were forced to come to terms with a profound change in the demands for social policy (including those of the family), and with the new indications by the EU on social inclusion (interpreted more and more as the activation of the individual) and with active ageing.

Above all, over the last 30 years there has been a spread of *policies with an integrated strategy*, and many of the social inclusion initiatives are carried out by inter-institutional groups made up of the Municipality's social operators, those of the cooperatives, health workers, street educators, cultural mediators etc.

In this way the passage takes place between a social policy of traditional character (sector-specific and aid-giving) to one oriented towards the planning and realisation of integrated services for the

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<sup>30</sup> For many years in Italy care for children and the elderly was the responsibility of the family; that is to say, of the women.

creation of the actual service, and to have an open rapport between the public and the end-user in pursuit of more personalised solutions.

Thus action is taken on ageing as an effect of shrinkage through the traditional assisted residences for the elderly (frequently inclusive of health care) and other assisted residences for the elderly who are poor and live alone (e.g. “Residenza di Vico Biscotto”); the opening of the day-time meeting places or ‘Social Centres’ in the city areas (e.g. “Casa di quartiere; “La Stanza”); AUSER projects for active ageing (“Età Libera”; “Camminare Insieme”); lightweight home services; etc

For emarginated adults there is the promotion of group or assisted accommodation; ‘accommodation for social inclusion’ (in apartments rented by the end-users themselves, but at a rent reduced through the mediation of the Municipality); and accommodation for groups of self-sufficient elderly individuals. For families and minors, especially if foreign, support is offered by Family’s bureau; Unit Education Street; Social and cultural circles; etc

Likewise, it is interesting to note how even in policies for urban regeneration in the historic centre and in the ex-industrial areas, multitask teams are formed that see urban specialists and architects side by side with the social personnel, both public and private involved in social policy (viz. the Contratto di quartiere now operating in the Ghetto).

Finally, other forms of integrated running of social policies in a logic of governance are the promotion and animation at a territorial level of policies that connect employment and social inclusion (through projects like the Incubator and the Job Centre operating in Cornigliano and Maddalena).

If we look at this new style in *policy actions*, we can see how a system of continuous interaction has developed between the territorial *stakeholders* who take part in the formulation of the agenda and in the local *decision-making* on the various ways to combat urban decline and social disadvantage.

Is it therefore possible to speak of a kind of “*Social regeneration strategy*”? And could the attention jointly given to social well-being and economic growth, and pro-growth objectives and pro-equity policies represent a complete governance strategy with which to address the problems caused by depopulation?

With some revisions, we may observe following the “Modes of governance” of Di Gaetano and Strom (2003) that in the Social Cohesion policies in Genoa developed a governance that from being *Populist*<sup>31</sup> (in the 80s), gradually became *Pluralist*<sup>32</sup> (90s) and then *Corporatist*<sup>33</sup> (over the last 10years). The processes of *Voice* expressed by the citizens and organisations in civil society (and by some community leaders) over the 80’s laid the basis for an inclusive form of government (first forms of citizen-participation) which has brought important new achievements in the planning and implementation of social services for poor people (political objectives symbolic).

Over the years the mobilisation of civil society has continued, but with less intensity (Annex 3); And also as a result of transformation of the laws for NGOs, many voluntary associations have seen advantage in transforming themselves into ONLUS (no profit organization) or in joining Social Cooperatives or Consortiums. The role of these last has continued to strengthen and they have a strategic (almost indispensable) role for the social care system over all the city. Through forms of out-sourcing the public service finances social service, and tries to guarantee that the territory is covered by personal services that the public service alone could never deal with (because of cuts by central government in social spending).

Thus, in the Corporative model closest to the characteristics of recent years, we have modified the element *Key decision makers* and changed *politicians and civic leaders* to *politicians and org.*

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<sup>31</sup> Bottom up process.

<sup>32</sup> A great many of NGOs took part in policy making and delivery social services.

<sup>33</sup> A consolidated number of Social Cooperatives (or Consortiums) became strategic interlocutors in policy making and delivery of social services all over the city (LegaCoop; Confocooperative; Agorà; Afet;

*interests*. This is because the political will of local government together with the leadership of social functions carried out by certain NGOs, through *consensus building*, have created “purposeful” political objectives (pro-equity - see also Pierre, *Modes of Urban Governance*, 1999) .

A final point needs to be made on the reasons for inclusion/exclusion of some actors in policy making. This is not a voluntary exclusion of some in favour of others, but simply that some actors (both private and private Associations) have acquired such a competence through the constant provision of some services that they have acquired a privileged status. Naturally the representation of interests is also of considerable importance, and is extremely intense at the head of some of the largest Social enterprises (Auxilium-Caritas, Agorà, Legacoop or Confcooperative).

Figure 3 - Policy cycle – Social and Cohesion Policy in Genoa

(this timetable refers to broad policy making of Local government in social policy and sustainable growth (it is not referred to a single plans or project))

|                           | end 70s/80s  | 90s  | 00s   |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|
| <b>AGENDA SETTING</b>     | Shrinkage gets not part in agenda but the attention is toward resolving isolation, ageing and social alienation (they are indirect impacts of shrinkage)   | Shrinkage gets not part in agenda but “other words” get part in policy making: ageing, social decay, segregation and inequalities between neighbourhood; inequalities between social groups;   | Other words or definitions take part in political agenda: Active Ageing; Migration; Minors; Cultural Integration; Abandonment of some urban zones; Poverty; Social decay; Unemployment; Social Inclusion;   |
| <b>POLICY FORMULATION</b> | Policy bottom up (citizen and families ask assistance and social care to local government); Politicians Leaders at Local government and Community Leaders manage the Reform social care system; <u>They also support the diffusion of culture pro-welfare and socio-democratic approach.</u><br>Non decision about social and urban decay... | Policy network: local and regional governments collaborate with a lot of social workers (in sanitary, educational, training, cultural sectors) to break-up of pattern of segregation and <u>to diffuse preventive approach at social needs.</u><br>Main goals are: improving living conditions through creation of territorial system care and urban renewal, and favouring social inclusion-equal opportunities ... | Policy community: local and regional government with some specific actors (mainly social cooperatives/consortium) programme social care system (Social Urban Plan 2006); <u>Universalistic approach</u> to improve access of citizens to social services, healthcare, amenities, cultural supply, educational and training system; activation and empowerment of citizens ... (European mainstream influences local policy) |
| <b>DECISION MAKING</b>    | Socio-sanitary integrated approach; Debate and confront between public and private sector (first agreements)   | Held technocratic;<br>Bargaining among a great of actors to create territorial services all over the city; Pluralistic modes of governance: conflictual relations among NGOs;<br>Citizen Participation to decision making; Agreements between public and NGOs (multi-task working groups)  | Cooperation, out-sourcing, externalization of social services from local government to NGOs;<br>Citizen Participation to decision making;   |
| <b>IMPLEMENTATION</b>     | CAD – Assistance at home to elderly people; Support and social care to family, to minors, to handicap persons; Social Centres (aggregative, preventive and assistance functions); Table for poor people;   | <i>Not more alone</i> project in Social Housing (cohabitation between elderly and young people); Social Centres (aggregative, preventive, assistance functions); Table for poor people; Social Inclusion projects; URBAN I (European Program); Creation public spaces, parks; Employment Centre; Job Centre (at Cornigliano); Local Development Plan “Centro Storico (Inner City);                                   | <i>Caregiver</i> project (regional level); Cafè Alzheimer; Cafè di Oz; <i>SiCura</i> project; <i>Età Libera</i> project; Vouchers to non independent people (regional level); Regional Fund to non independent people; <i>Macht</i> project (metropolitan level) between elderly and caregivers; Active Ageing projects (Walking Together; Silver Steps); Public Housing and Social Housing (free or favoured cost for      |

|                                  |   |   |   |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|
|                                  |   |   | flats); URBAN II; Contratti di Quartiere “Ghetto” (at Inner City); Local and cultural mediators; Childcare; Public space and park; ALMP- Active Labour Market Policy;   |
| <b>EVALUATION (main results)</b> | Shutting out care institutions (mental hospital, orphanage); Family’s House; Social Housing; Assistance care at home for elderly people | Improvement living conditions in Inner city; Municipal Office for Employment in Via Lomellini; renewal of buildings in Inner City; several flats intended for single mother, young artists, households; elderly people alone; | Basic social services in Ghetto Neighbourhood (Health; Drop-in; Consultancy); 12 lease contracts of cohabitation between young and elderly people; 8 projects for Active Ageing (by AUSER); Housing Agency (Public Office in Municipality); Projects “Diamante”, “Pra” (they are suburbs on the hills over Genoa) about social inclusion strategy (school, cultural event, participation of citizens, health services, Recreational activities for minors and young made NGOs); Network of Social Workers to promote cultural integration of foreigners; GhattUp – Headquarters of 35 NGOs; |

**Note: Cohesion Policy Features:**

**Structural condition:**

- **Dependence upon national and regional normative framework**
- **Financial spending and transfers from EU, State, Region**

**Actor and their pattern relations**

- **Leadership (politicians and community)**
- **Political culture (left orientation)**
- **Social care culture (assistance vs. preventive vs. universalistic)**

**Strengths:**

- **Presence of key actors**
- **Institutional capacity**
- **Active Civil Society**

**Weaknesses:**

- **Context of social spending cutbacks**
- **Policy process seems a *Muddling through* (Doing what you can do)**

#### 4. The outcomes of governance responses to the problems caused by shrinkage in the selected policy field(s).

##### 4.1. Housing and Regeneration

After the evictions of the 80's the housing emergency was essentially resolved by the batch building of social housing estates that made possible the distribution of many public housing apartments. The number of flats produced in the 80s (see graph below) is around 1889 more than 30% of the whole housing stock produced by ARTE. Even if now this cycle of public housing development has gained the bad reputation of a big mistake there is no doubt that the supply of a large stock of public housing contributed to equilibrate the housing shortage, as it is explained by the figures regarding evictions (see table below).

Figure 4 – New Public Housing produced




Table 2 – Number of evictions

|                                 | 1983  | 1984  | 1985  | 1986  | 1987  | 1988  | 1989  | 1990  | 1991  | 1992  |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Sentences                       | 8.927 | 6.998 | 3.945 | 4.708 | 4.902 | 3.677 | 2.366 | 2.328 | 2.264 | 1.489 |
| Executed by Police intervention | 662   | 676   | 568   | 1.543 | 541   | 445   | 385   | 447   | 409   | 405   |

During the 90's the number of families that gained the right to a public housing apartment was more or less equivalent to the number of evictions. The as yet unimproved condition of the centre also did little to induce landlords to invest in their properties and this bad state of the housing also drove inhabitants away. At this point Regeneration was still not begun while the first foreign migrants were coming. Because of the decline in the population the settlement into estates of thousands of people was a no cost operation, and this also caused the empty apartments of the historic centre to go up again in rental value, and allowed them to be occupied by the immigrant population living without legal residence permits.

This accelerated the need to carry out the projects that had been planned. The regeneration of various areas of the historic centre had an effect both on the ecology and the property market. The environmental impact of the urban regeneration was to cause a significant reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> levels; after their restructuring some districts were also turned into pedestrian areas.

As regards the property market, one needs to consider that as a result of the abolition of the 'Equo Canone' (The Fair Rent Act), and the low cost of mortgages generated by the introduction of the Euro, there was a sharp rise in property in all Italian cities. But in Genoa the rise in property value had a peculiarity, in as much as almost the whole of the medieval centre now made up the difference in terms of real estate value compared with the other desirable areas of the city.

However, areas excluded from this rise in value are those where the restructuring processes are still underway and where the immigrants are still concentrated. The urban regeneration has also had an impact on social makeup of the historic centre, in which the foreigners who live there represent only a small percentage of the immigrants present in the whole of Genoa, and are confined to certain parts in it.

On the other hand, the regeneration has had a positive effect of the number of tourists arriving in Genoa. In the distant the Ford era, these numbers had been very high, but they had been visitors who combined travel with work and whose needs were linked to the port activities, which, up to 50's, continued operate on the pier of the Ancient Port. As a consequence of this, the tourist facilities available were hardly geared to holiday travel. Over the 90's, however, tourist accommodation increased not only numerically, but also underwent a structural upgrading with the appearance of luxury hotels, the congress centre and the tourist attractions on the waterfront.

## 4.2. Social Cohesion

The analysis of the outcomes of governance responses in this policy field as presented in this Report seeks to illustrate which forms of collaboration have been carried out in the following; projects for social inclusion and multicultural integration; support for disadvantaged categories (single and non self-sufficient elderly people; immigrants, minors and the poor); offering job opportunities, social housing and other services. The policy making in last decades follows an integrated approach: social and health policies; social and labour; social and educational; social and housing,...

The analysis of the governance responses also seeks to understand whether the actions of urban recovery and social inclusion carried out in different ways and at different times have had a positive effect on the level of life for the resident population in terms of well-being and sustainable development.

Because the projects that have started in recent years have been so many (as emerges from the interviews), we will only present a few as "example projects" that have been carried out by the Municipality of Genoa in a number of areas that had experienced the phenomenon of urban decline (Historic Centre, Sampierdarena e Cornigliano)<sup>34</sup>.

We have already seen through the socio-statistical analysis of the WP2 research how the Centro Est stands out as the District with the greatest population decline, but at the same time preserves a very high density (15% of the total population). The demographic morphology of the zone is likewise composite, with the presence of an upper middle class alongside a high concentration of homeless

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<sup>34</sup> The choice has fallen on these urban zones is because it is here that one can most see the effects due, *firstly* to the depopulation, and *subsequently* to the re-population that has occurred in the last 20 years. The abandoned state of the residential buildings, the already difficult social conditions and the arrival of a new low-income population effectively served to increase the demand for social services, which, as we will see, was neglected for some time.

and single elderly people. This is the reason why this Area has always represented a sort of social Laboratory, where most of the services available have been tested and operate, from lightweight assistance to integrated services, family help desks, etc...

After the Historic Centre, Sampierdarena is the urban zone that since the 90's has been most intensively settled by a population of foreigners (6,589 foreigners residing in 2007; 11% of external migrants reside in Sampierdarena). This phenomenon, we are told during the interviews, is linked both to the drop in property prices after the industrial crisis and to the intermediation carried out in the district by the Don Bosco Silesian Catholic Church<sup>35</sup>. The church has acted almost as a guarantee to the Genoese families in need of someone to look after their elderly, and in this way the immigrant women instantly became a part of the "private" and "undeclared" social market care.

In addition, Cornigliano was obliged to face the social question left in the wake of the dismantling of the steel works, the loss of a high number of jobs (about 20,000), the progressive ageing of the population and the emptying of houses.

The challenge for the local institutions was that of using the available public funding to achieve a number of objectives; on the one hand to satisfy the articulated request for urban improvement (Urban I and II), and on the other to improve services and the working and living conditions in these areas in particular, and in the city as a whole.

*"Social Regeneration" and Urban regeneration (the relation between public, private and third sector)*

One of the projects that best illustrates the importance of the governance activated in the area of social inclusion is the Contratto di Quartiere "Ghetto" of 2007. This took place in one of the most critical areas of the Historic Centre<sup>36</sup> and it represents the major example of policy action which welfare benefits should be included in urban regeneration program. This neighbourhood has historically "accumulated" poverty, destitution, and a state of abandonment in isolation from the rest of the city. There are no shops, business activities or other types of services. It is only recently that through the Contratto di quartiere the Municipality has activated a process for the participation by the citizens (talks, focus groups, interviews of citizens, a survey conducted by the university), and above all for the participation of third sector organisations (35 associations).

After this governance project there was the opening of a *Drop-In* desk (first assistance for drug addicts and the homeless)<sup>37</sup>; *ADIS Project* (day reception and social inclusion); Casa di quartiere *Ghettup*<sup>38</sup> (acts as the centre for various voluntary associations, including the Religious Community San Benedetto); and an *Ambulatorio* (first aid station) managed by A.S.L. (Local Health Authority). Together with these social initiatives the Urban Office of the Municipality has produced a programme for the repair of a number of buildings, whose apartments will become social housing (*Casa della Giovine* – for young woman and *Nursery School*). Other apartments have been restructured through contributions paid by the Municipality to private landlords.

These projects have been in operation for a number of years, but social decline is still visible both in the condition of the streets and houses, and in the people who live there (prostitutes, trans-sexuals,

<sup>35</sup> The Church of Don Bosco has acted as an important reference point for Latin American families, especially for mothers who arrived alone and subsequently sought a family reunion. Sampierdarena is home to the largest Ecuadorian community, in which the families all come from the same villages.

<sup>36</sup> This is an enclave closed in on either side by two of the most beautiful streets of the Historic Centre (Via Lomellini e Via Cairoli are both recognised as being UNESCO heritage).

<sup>37</sup> This project was at the centre of a heated conflict between a committee of citizens and the bank next door, who obliged the entrance to the centre to be moved to another street.

<sup>38</sup> This project is funded by Urban II. It performs social inclusion activities such as, elementary language courses for foreigners, a legal help desk and a day reception and information service on the city's social services.

drug addicts, clandestine immigrants, minors on the run from their families, or anyone needing to “hide or find protection from the law and from politics”<sup>39</sup>).

### *Migrants and young people (public actor and “lay” third sector collaboration)*

Bearing in mind that most of the policy actions described above have been with a mixed governance, we will outline two programmes addressed to multicultural integration, the *Laboratorio Migrazioni*<sup>40</sup> and the *Laboratorio di Educativa Territoriale* (LET)<sup>41</sup>.

The Laboratorio Migrazioni promotes intercultural education in the schools of the city. The interest of the project lies in the fact that it seeks to enhance the social inclusion of foreigners through the school, which is seen as the place of exchange and reciprocal recognition between Italians and foreigners. The project is founded on the idea that multiculturalism is the future for urban living together. Encouraging integration at the level of the youngest foreigners may encourage peaceful living together and avoid some conflicts of the type that have taken place in Sampierdarena.

Sampierdarena is the neighbourhood that has undergone the city’s greatest demographic transformation, with the presence of many elderly and a 20% increase in adolescents over the last 5 years (mostly of Ecuadorian origin). This multi-cultural and inter-generational environment has created many areas of conflict over the years. A problem that is strongly felt by the population is the presence of “Ecuadorian baby gangs” (Latinos) that have been responsible for disturbances in the district until a recent sedation of the conflicts between the rival bands was effected by the intermediation of a research group from the University<sup>42</sup>. This is the context of social disadvantage and conflict in which the Laboratorio di Educativa Territoriale operate, and, in collaboration with the District Centro-Ovest carry out policy actions for the integration of these young foreigners at a scholastic, social, and subsequently at an employment level.

### *Occupability and social inclusion (Local and regional government, Trade Unions and Third Sector)*

In Cornigliano a project has been activated that demonstrates how in facing the socio-economic transformation of the ex-industrial areas it is not sufficient only to intervene by urban improvement of the infrastructures.

This project has social objectives and has been called Job Centre. It started in 1996<sup>43</sup> out of a dialogue between the Municipality, the trade unions and the third sector associations (A.C.L.I.; Committee to Cornigliano, Parish Churches, Association “Croce Bianca”...) on the serious social and employment situation in Cornigliano (Genoa’s identity crisis of transition from being a capital of heavy industry to one of European culture). The activity of the Job Centre has aimed at facilitating the match between job demand and supply through work orientation services and

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<sup>39</sup> The Ghetto is as an area with NO Policy NO Police, it has been defined as “the black hole” during interviews.

<sup>40</sup> It was formed in 1993 by a group of teachers of the Municipality infant schools.

<sup>41</sup> The service is a part of the Territorial Educational Agency that the Municipality established in all the Municipalities in the 90’s

<sup>42</sup> This group has been chaired by Luca Queirollo Palmas, a researcher at the University of Genoa who also took part in our Stakeholders Meeting in June 2010.

<sup>43</sup> The project was financed by Urban II and was managed by the Municipality of Genoa up to 2004. It then passed to the management by the Province of Genova, which made some organisational changes to it.

training courses for the unemployed, immigrants and young people looking for work. Since 2002 the Job Centre has also been at the head of the Incubator at Cornigliano<sup>44</sup>.

Another interesting project is the *Development Plan* in the urban zone of Maddalena (Historic Centre). This is a peculiar district since, despite being close to three busy main streets of the city centre and to the central Municipality of Palazzo Tursi, Via Maddalena has remained a run-down area where local criminality and prostitution have deep roots and exist side by side with the bourgeoisie of Genoa who own the penthouse apartments of these ancient buildings. This is a classic example of a shrunk zone which had a large population drop in the 80's and 90's (also as a result of many public offices moving away) and where many commercial activities shut down. Those who participate in the *Development Plan*<sup>45</sup> have held discussion Laboratories that also actively included the citizens, and produced a series of initiatives such as the creation of social laboratories, information desks for businesses and cultural activities (theatre laboratories). This project only began in 2008 so their work is still in progress.

#### *Social Policy (Collaboration of public-private sector)*

Again in the centre of Genoa forms of protected housing for the elderly have been experimented with (e.g. the "Residenza di Vico Biscotto"); and "accommodations for social inclusion", a project that is co-financed by Urban II whereby the Municipality, in collaboration with private property owners, buys or rents apartments at a reduced price, which it then allocates to users of the social services. In the city of Genoa itself the CARIGE Bank Foundation (private) funds the *Project "Età Libera"* for active ageing. Another important funding actor that has entered into partnership with the *Maddalena Development Plan* is the San Paolo Banking Group.

#### *Social Policy (Collaboration of public actor and "Catholic" third sector)*

The relations between the Municipality and the voluntary Catholic associations while good, are free of ties or financing on the part of the Municipality. These actors operate capillary services over the whole of the territory both in terms of lightweight assistance and accommodation facilities for all categories (the aged, disabled, homeless, families and minors, drug addicts, prostitutes, child mothers etc.), and pursue a large number of projects through their own funding.

Bearing in mind that the public actor has always maintained a strong role in the guidance and coordination of inclusion policies, one can observe how most of the projects we are dealing with arise from a process of coming to terms on a territorial level between the public actor and the other stakeholders (Catholic and lay voluntary groups; social cooperation; AUSER; etc).


Many policy actions spring from an awareness that comes directly from the territory (policy bottom up) and from the knowledge accumulated by social operators (both public and private) through social work done directly on the territory.

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<sup>44</sup> The project receives national funding (Law 266/97 "Bersani-Law"). The Incubator acts as the head office for new businesses and offers assistance and services to new entrepreneurs

<sup>45</sup> Promoted by the Municipality di Genova, the Citizen Committee of Maddalena, the Tradesmens' Association and the San Paolo Banking Group.

**Figure 5 – Main actors, and related role, involved in governance response within Cohesion Policy**



Legend about role of actors:

- G: Guideline
- F: Financing
- N: Normative
- D: Delivery

## **5. Is the city [after shrinkage] characterised by a lack of capacity (financial, institutional etc.) in this policy area?**

### **5.1. Housing and Regeneration**

In the 80's the creation of public housing took place in direct correspondence with the existing national fund (Gescal, financed by general taxation and devolved to housing) being transferred to the Regions, who then transferred the funds to the Municipalities at their request. When this period ended with the closing down of that national fund in 1992, there were no longer to be sufficient funds for direct intervention and this situation placed Genoa on the same level as the other Italian cities.

The main problem was the restoration of the built and social environment in the historic centre, and on this Genoa may be taken as a model in the drive towards urban regeneration, being the only Italian city that has been fully able to transform its waterfront into a space for third sector activities. In the re-designing of the 'old port' Genoa was also the first city to use the name of an Italian "archi-star". This operation was done thanks to the resources available in real estate of the Port Authority, which was in turn gratified by the creation of the new trans-shipment port terminal. Subsequently, the Administration scored a success in the promotion of urban marketing, when in 2004 Genoa was awarded the title of 'European Cultural Capital'. At least one major cultural event is held each year in the old "palazzo ducale", which has become an exhibition centre.

The capacity of the Municipality as an institution to act has taken place on two levels. One was to exploit major events (the celebrations for Columbus' discovery of America and the G8 Summit) in order to attract the funds necessary for the major regeneration projects, like that of the waterfront. At this level the Municipality negotiated the acquisition of resources from the other institutions at both a local (The Port Authority) and a national level (the Government), carrying out projects that were greatly image-enhancing.

On the other level, the regeneration of the areas of the historic centre behind the port (one of the largest in Europe) followed a logic that, while similar, remained distinct. During the 90's the improvement of the districts of the historic centre had avoided large scale interventions involving the housing stock of entire large districts. In point of fact, in the 80's a similar action programmed to run at the same time as the renovation of the old Port had ended with a ten year interruption to the work. The Municipality, lacking the legal instruments to contrast the speculation that was starting in the area, took action by expropriating a large part of the housing, in conformity to a style that was standard for public intervention in those years. This, however, exhausted the funds from the Ministry putting a halt to the works, and allowed the illegal occupation of the buildings that had been financed.

The lack of the regular flow of dedicated and organic funding obliged the Municipality to become very active in procuring funds for single specific projects and it did this from three different institutional sources; the Ministry, the Regione and the European Union (Genoa is the only city that has been awarded both cycles of Urban funding).

This gave rise to the idea of a *patchwork policy of improvement* that, being managed from a single office was able to work with unity. Clearly, the large dimensions of the area of the historic centre and the need to rely on single specific projects meant that within the centre itself there were often two speeds of the regeneration, with the part to the east being often wholly restored by comparison to the west. The restoration was made possible by the active participation of the citizens, but the levels of agreement and consensus within the Comitati di quartiere (Neighbours committees) were often variable. Some of these committees complained about the negative effects of the new services

in terms of the night life, while those from the areas that had not yet had the improvements complained about the urban decline.

There was a lack of ability in dealing with the social emergencies, which found a space in the areas still awaiting gentrification; thus many of the social problems were simply transferred to other parts of the centre. In recent years the task of the Municipality (which does not dispose of sufficient incentives) has been that of involving the major private housing actors in the offer of social housing at below market cost.

## **5.2. Social Cohesion**

On the relation between the capacity represented by the institutions, funding resources and shrinkage, a separate discussion is necessary for Cohesion Policy.

With regards to the capacity of the institutions, we can say that the effects caused by the shrinkage over the last thirty years have brought about a greater ability on the part of the Municipality of Genoa to carry out new governance responses (§4). It is because of the socio-demographic changes registered in Genoa that the policies for social inclusion have been used as a strategy to act in support of the weaker elements in the population, on the problem of ageing and the presence of foreigners.

On the question of funding, the drop in the budget available for social spending and for the actions against the urban and social decline in Genoa do not derive from shrinkage, but are strongly affected by the reductions in national funding to all the territories over the years. Social policy has always been treated as a residual issue on the Italian political agenda.

The founding of the *National Fund for Social Policies* and the *National Fund for Social Inclusion* after 2000 constituted an important support for social spending, both for the regional and local level. After the Constitution reform (2001), social assistance (and also labour, health and educational training) became the exclusive responsibility of the Regional administrations (vertical subsidiarity). The Regions receive funding from government through the above mentioned Funds, to which the regional government add their own co-financing, and together with certain further funds derived from taxation, produce their programmes for social assistance, labour and health services. A part of this budget is directed at the Municipalities, or, more precisely, at the Socio-sanitary Districts (which are constituted by one or more Municipalities and one A.S.L. (Local Health Office) on the basis of population numbers and socio-demographic characteristics.

The progressive cuts carried out by a series of State Budgets in recent years seriously threaten some social services and forms of assistance, that run the risk of no longer being guaranteed by the Regions. In particular, the National Fund for Social Policies has gone down from 400 million euros in 2009 to 275 million in 2010; and this year there is serious concern because the *Regional Fund for non-independent persons* that has a yearly cost of 22 million euros (of which 14 million co-financed from Regional taxes), has not been renewed by central government.

## **6. Does the city [after shrinkage] experience a dependence on external resources to enable local actors to cope with the problems in this policy area?**

### **6.1. Housing and Regeneration**

The lack of resources devoted to urban and housing policies is a characterising trait of the last twenty years. At the start of the 80's Gescal, the national housing fund, paid for by a deduction from dependent workers' pay, was transferred to the Regioni, who were responsible for it by law. This generated a wave of construction of public housing in all the cities in Italy; however, during the crisis of 1992, in order to balance state spending, Gescal was abolished.

Once those funds were finished no further national funding was transferred to the Municipalities for this purpose. The taxes levied by the Comuni are unable to substitute those national funds, given that the only tax the Municipality now charges is a small addition to income tax, while the pre-existing household tax has been abolished. Thus the financial autonomy of the Municipalities is now minimal.

But, if the Municipalities in Italy had to depend on the income from their taxes, the position of Genoa, in spite of ageing, the areas of poverty and the low level of business activity, would in any case be a favourable one, given its higher than average income levels.

The lack of resources is therefore caused by the legislative framework. Up to the 80's the Italian State provided a constant fund flow from the highest level of administration down to the lower ones. With the end of Gescal also came the end of the financial capacity for new public housing. However, when the institutions of the Municipality tried an approach that does not depend on its own direct supply of housing, they faced the same operational problems. For example the capability to sustain private tenants was extremely limited. The national fund instituted in 1998 to support rent-paying tenants has, since then, progressively been reduced despite the exponential growth of private sector renting prices.

The re-orientation of policies for urban improvement took place in the 90's. In Italy there are no organic National Plans for the transfer of funds to the Municipalities. It is the government that finances specific projects presented by the Municipalities through a public competition issued by the Ministry. The financial capacity of all the Municipalities is thus directly dependent on their individual planning capacity.

The two models (construction of public housing and regeneration) are therefore different.

When in the 80's the prevalent pattern was that of a constant flow of funds, there were no financial difficulties in completing the construction of new housing estates. But immediately after this the IACP went under, partly because of bad management, and partly because the incomes of public housing tenants made it hard to impose rents high enough to cover the maintenance of the buildings. Because the financing had been one of constant flow, once that source of central funding had been abolished, in practical terms the construction of public housing became impossible.

When, instead, the Comune was faced with the task of restoring the districts of the historic centre, the capacity of the institutions to obtain financial resources, was frequently affected by problems regarding the amounts of State funds actually transferred. The first experiment in urban regeneration at Prè had conformed to the style of public action typical of the law regulating the construction of public housing (Law 167) by executing the preventive expropriation of the entire area for the project.

But central funding was not without its limitations, being based on fixed term funds for "experimental construction". Thus, once the area had been made into public property, there were no further funds with which to continue the regeneration. This is why subsequent regeneration plans have regarded far more restricted areas. The times for the starting of each plan is subordinate to the

allocation of funds and approval by the Comitato Centrale of the detailed plan for the regeneration. In general, 9 years pass from the issuing of the public competition to the completion of a project.

## 6.2. Social Cohesion

As we have said (§ 6), the scarcity of funding has led Genoa to make increasing use of internal and external resources in order to guarantee certain types of social policy.

In this policy area “external resources” can entail the use by the Municipality of voluntary and social work performed by the third sector, which in territory of Genoa seems almost to represent “a virtual extension” of the public sector social services.

Another form of (also financial) external collaboration is the active participation brought by some key actors such as bank Foundations (the CARIGE Foundation being the most involved in policies of active ageing), or the San Paolo Banking Group.

Finally, for what concerns social inclusion policies, the active participation of the Municipality in programmes such as Urban, Eurocity, and recently City Creative (in collaboration with Leipzig), have represented important opportunities for investment in the local economy, and to promote projects to contrast the social disadvantage still present in the city.

Genoa is, in fact, a city that has had “two speeds of growth”; on the one hand it has been able to regenerate itself through investments in culture, innovation, training, urban renovation and tourism; on the other it is one with a specific demographic pattern (high levels of elderly people, presence of foreigners with low work profiles, lack of young people, low birth rate), which inhibits growth and makes policies for social cohesion extremely necessary.

An interesting fact to emerge at the end of the interviews is how many actions of intervention were linked to the “season of events” (the Columbian celebrations of 1992, the award of “Genoa Capital of Culture”, the period of Contratti di quartiere, and the Urban projects from the mid 90’s to the present). These events also made it possible to invest large resources in the area of social inclusion, and it is precisely during those years that the “intuition” developed that actions for urban development, growth and improvement must necessarily also include actions to combat poverty, favouring the distribution of the well being generated among all the citizens<sup>46</sup>.

Nevertheless, the existence of many forms of urban decline, especially in certain traditional areas of the historic centre (Ghetto, Maddalena) or Sampierdarena and Cornigliano, lead us to a confirmation of the initial hypothesis that in our study of governance we should also consider Cohesion policies: the pro-growth policies represent important events for the funding-raising and activation of medium-term programming at city level (*visions*). But if they are not accompanied by parallel action against social exclusion and disadvantage they can bring about an unequal progress for the citizens, or actions of only partial urban recovery. Some districts that have been “cleaned up” may attract a new middle to upper class (artists, intellectuals, new bourgeoisie), but can also act like a “lever” to expel the disadvantaged who reside there, forcing them to move to a different area, and thus generating new forms of shrinkage with consequent negative impacts.

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<sup>46</sup> These, more or less, are the contents of the European Commission “Cohesion Policy and cities: the urban contribution to growth and jobs in the regions” SEC(2006) 928. Bruxelles 13.7.2006 COM (2006) 385 final.

## **7. Does the city [after shrinkage] undergo contradictory and unstable governance arrangements in which local decisions are highly dependent on shifts in external frameworks?**

We have already seen that shrinkage, strictly, did not form part of the political agenda of the Municipality from the start, but why was this?

Firstly, on the basis of the literature on policy analysis it is necessary to make a distinction between a *political agenda* (all issues of collective concern) and an *institutional agenda* (issues on which the policy maker decides to intervene) (Cobb, Elder 1972). Shrinkage in Genoa was not perceived as an alarming problem, yet in the course of our study we have been able to point to a series of actions in the city context that are linked to it (see § 4 e 5).

The emptying of certain urban zones served to increase the number of empty houses and levels of poverty, as in low income families, elderly people living alone in large run down apartments, new migrants, the unemployed, prostitutes, alcoholics and drug addicts etc<sup>47</sup>.

This situation generated a social demand for services and infrastructures, which during the decade between 1980-1990 continued to be neglected, while the policy maker limited his action to dealing with existing situation using the policy instruments at his disposal (lack of territorial social services and the support by non profit associations).

The context of the policies in those years was also greatly conditioned by central government, with the Italian State preserving then, as now, many of the Napoleonic features of a centralised nation state. The Federalist demands of recent years are still a long way from allowing autonomy to the Regions in the same way this is done in Germany in the Lander, or in the Comunidas Autonome in Spain.

Before the policies of urban regeneration in the 90's and the structural initiatives for social inclusion, certain areas of the Historic Centre were the scene of bitter social contrasts that led to the stratification of a number of social problems that policy was not immediately able to deal with. We think this is an important part of the urban issue. Our hypothesis is that failure to resolve the various direct and indirect impacts produced by shrinkage brought about a worsening of the city's social question, and we are also of the opinion that the individual policies of urban regeneration and boosts to the economy, while effective, have been insufficient to contrast the economic and social decline that has formed in some urban zones. In the case of Genoa we know that the depopulation is linked to the historical demographic pattern and low fertility. The policy maker has not carried out anti-shrinkage policies over the years in the areas of child care and work/life balance, whereas much attention has gone, for example, to the ageing population.

Even the arrival of the foreigners was left for years without regulation (probably also because of the lack of a national legislation on the question), yet on the data analysed by WPI we have observed how their presence has acted as "a natural form of anti-shrinkage", causing an increase in the resident population and the birth rate to rise, albeit by little. In the near future the social situation will tend to worsen, which is why there is the need for "containment policies" against the problems that have been created over past years.

Over the next few years the problem of assistance for the elderly will explode, with the generation of the baby boom of the 60's reaching old age with needs very different from the elderly of today.

According to the statistics projected the persons over 80's in Genoa will increase from the present 7% to 13% by 2013; while at the same time the adults to look after them will diminish. As maintained by one of our interviewees, who has published an article on this subject (Italian Journal of Social Policy n. 3/2006), this question is still not talked about enough. It would seem that the

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<sup>47</sup> Many of those we have interviewed refer that during the 80's the historic Centre and the area near the port of Genoa were considered 'off-limits', being places where there was a concentration of poverty and crime.

local administration is able to intervene only once the problem “explodes”, whereas it ought to adopt preventive policies.

The strategy of the current policy appears to be pro-growth oriented (globalisation, new routes beyond Europe, new partners for the port economy, European programmes such as City Creative, innovations), while at the same time the social question remains secondary and it seems always subordinated to “something” (financial resources, political determination, the voices of the citizens, the specific wishes of the local leader).

If we turn our minds to the “game of supply and demand” (Meny, Thoenig 1989), in an ideal policy cycle the social needs and imbalances determine the response on the part of politics, which has the responsibility for dealing with the problems of society. Yet, in confronting the specific question of shrinkage the policy making of the government of Genoa seems to have been characterised by a sort of *muddling through* (*à la Linblom*); that is to say, by a policy process of implementation that proceeded by trial and errors, which then produced adaptations by hindsight (adjusting the trajectory).

This type of policy making may derive from the lack of a sufficient national legislative framework capable of solving collective questions<sup>48</sup>; or it may be a more specifically local characteristic: i.e. the role of local leaders or powerful forces able to influence the institutional agenda (lobby); or caused by the length of time required by the institutions for the realisation of certain procedures (we can see the Contratto di quartiere “Ghetto” started 10 years ago and has not yet finished).

The time that elapses from the planning to the realisation of the regeneration policy, together with the one-off nature of the funding that is itself bound to the existence of certain programmes, has determined a two speed recovery of the some urban zones, in which the realisation of a specific project was made to coincide with a major event or a cycle of European funding, while other interventions had to wait on the State’s cycle of funding. This has brought about a “patchwork regeneration” in which improved areas exist alongside relatively serious pockets of urban decline. The mixed presence of individuals of different social type, which is still a characteristic of the historic centre, is due more to this fact than to the success of the inclusion policies, or the processes of regeneration seeking to inhibit social segregation.

Broadly speaking, one might describe the 80’s as the years that brought a serious change in the city’s urban social make up, but its needs were not yet fully met by the political agenda (more in the case of social policies, than urban policies); while the 90’s were the years of institutional policy change during which the local government reorganised itself and achieved greater autonomy in its policy-making. After 2000 the social demands changed again with the massive increase in foreigners (15% in 2008), and in the elderly in the population (27% in 2008); and we witness a situation in which policies seem to “chase after” the social demands in a national context of social spending cutbacks. The collaboration and contracting out to the third sector is further consolidated (also as a result of the national reform Law 382/2000) to the point of forming a sort of “parallel public system” that co-manages both the programming and operation of an integrated system of personal social service (*welfare community*).

Turning to the field of governance, we can say that in the 80’s the leading role of the public political actor was particularly marked (see above); in the 90’s and after 2000 this role has remained, but forms of *inclusive decision making* have begun to develop and consolidate in both policy fields. Interest groups, associations and citizens’ committees have entered policy making through the new governance processes (round tables, citizens’ speeches, mechanisms for participation, agreements) which has worked towards that we said a “*participative urban governance*”.

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<sup>48</sup> The two speed factor is a typical aspect of the policy cycle, and social and urban issues arise more quickly than the policy makers can solve the problems.

## Conclusions.

The first conclusion of our analysis is that the governing coalitions in Genoa were not formed with the direct objective of producing anti-shrinkage policies. On the other hand, demographic trends, above all in cases like the decline we have described for Genoa, are determined by causes that can only be identified and modified at a macro level. For instance, the low birth rate in France and northern European countries has been contrasted by incentives and services decided by central government; whereas in an as yet non-federal system like Italy, these are not within the reach of local government policies.

Shrinkage, has, however partly changed the importance of various actors, both in terms of the roles of the *stakeholders* and the individuals that the policies are addressed to.

When Genoa was a city whose industrial make up was constituted largely by State industries, the pattern for the creation/solution of conflicts had been simpler. The great shipyards and the heavy steel industry were in some way dependent on the decisions of central government, therefore industrial relations or investment decisions that would have an impact on the city's growth often turned into political conflicts in which the strong left wing leanings of the city's politicians often became decisive in determining a positive or negative outcome to the issues. The same can be said for the social inclusion policies, which during the city's intensively industrial period had offered greater guarantees to certain specific social categories (manual workers, families, national migrants...).

This political pattern was radically modified by the disappearance of the State industries and the demographic decline, even if in some contexts it continued to be repeated.

What has, however, remained is the importance of the organizations in civil society descended from the workers' movement and the grassroots movements engaged in solidarity. Some of these actors (the cooperatives that have become large commercial distribution companies) have regularly been sponsors of the Municipality's initiatives, while others (the social cooperatives) make a fundamental contribution to the actions for social inclusion. In this ambit the most structured ones that have grown in importance are those devoted to the elderly (Auser) or to ex-workers. This increased network of cultural associations has difficulty in reconciling its services for children and young people with the fact that most of people on its registers continue to be elderly. For these operators, with the growth of an elderly population, it has been easier to achieve institutional recognition for some of their projects directed at this category.

This institutional recognition has also been the result of an interface at a national and Regional level that has proved more sensitive to ageing policies than to those to contrast poverty. Finally, ageing has had considerable weight in the dozens of residents' committees that participated in negotiations on over the projects for the transformation of the city's districts. In practice the pressure was to contrast the urban decline on the one hand, but to avoid the transformed areas turning into leisure areas on the other.

Thus, the principal actor in the post-industrial transformation of Genoa has been the Municipality, which, aside from receiving pressure from the lobbies, has taken on an active role in fund raising and the formation of coalitions in support of urban growth. With regard to social policies it has unavoidably made use of collaboration from the third sector and the social work carried out by both lay and Catholic social organisations.

The local government has carried out these operations in the context of discontinuous and not strictly strategic funding on the part of the State, which in Italy has never equipped itself with organic policies for urban transformation and has always relegated social policy to a residual position, with corresponding cuts in the social budget. The special transfers of funds to Genoa have

all been connected to the great events, while the national interest during the 80's had been restricted to supporting the construction of the new port<sup>49</sup>.

This has pushed the Municipality into taking an active role in the transformation process by making use of the extemporary funds that it has been able to obtain, and during the early 2000's to becoming particularly successful in marketing and urban networking at a European level. These networking experiences can best be turned to exchanging '*best practices*' than to obtaining the means to carry out the transformation.

In this new public urban entrepreneurialism, the leadership of the mayor has played a more important role than was the case in the 90's. Since the introduction in Italy of the direct election of the mayor in 1993, and notwithstanding the continuity of left wing political dominance in the government of Genoa, over the last two decades it is possible to observe some different styles of leadership.

The current mayor, who has been in office for almost eight years, has been associated with a leadership determined to impose an active role on the Municipality for the promotion of a number of important transformation projects. He has requested a new Urban Plan to be supervised by the architect Renzo Piano, and has created a specific partly autonomous office at the Municipality, whose work is the redaction of the new projects; meanwhile another unit within the Dipartimento of Urbanistica continues to manage the projects relating to the preceding Urban Plan.

In the area of job creation she has strongly supported the realisation of the Erzelli project, which plans to create an ICT district by building an Ericsson centre on a hillside close to the ex-industrial districts, but must be considered anyway an heritage of the previous government.

She has also pushed forward a strongly contested project for an urban motorway to cross the city from west to east, notwithstanding the fact that the formally constituted participation groups from the districts affected have not yet extinguished their protests. She has promoted actions to contrast the social disadvantage rooted in certain historic areas of the city (prostitution in the Maddalena and the issue of the homeless); the reorganisation of childcare; and the improvement of services of primary assistance for immigrants and child mothers.

If the style of leadership can be considered as discontinuous, the same cannot be said for the objectives of the policies considered in our analysis. The orientation has been that of a growth-oriented regeneration to transform Genoa into a city capable of taking advantage of the post-industrial economy (attraction of tourists, leisure-related spending, the rise in property prices, the growth of hi-tech business activity).

On the other hand the proposal has been for a growth that would be socially sustainable and preserve a social mix in the historic centre, which is also one of the characteristic attractions for both tourists and residents using the area for the enjoyment of leisure time. Growth and equity have had differentiated governance and success in achieving their objectives.

Even though the role of the Municipality remains central in both areas, what changes is the way it interconnects with the other institutional and private actors. In the case of the social policies the dependence on invariably insufficient State funding has made it impossible to avoid congestion between some Third Sector associations and the Municipality itself. While in the case of some policies (e.g. for the aged) the drive may have come from areas of public sector leadership with some experience of voluntary work, the actual realization would never have been possible without the presence of a strong Third Sector already established over the territory.

In the case of Regeneration Policies the public actor needs the support Ministerial programmes, or carry out negotiations with local institutional actors, such as the Port Authority, to carry out what

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
<sup>49</sup> If we make a comparison with nearby Marseilles, the French State played a far more incisive role in ensuring that the metropolitan area of the city became more than just the location of a logistic point in the Mediterranean. Cf. for example, the entity of the Euromediterraneo project managed by a special organisation

[http://www.marseille.fr/sitevdm/jsp/site/Portal.jsp?document\\_id=473&portlet\\_id=484](http://www.marseille.fr/sitevdm/jsp/site/Portal.jsp?document_id=473&portlet_id=484)


are in essence processes of horizontal and vertical multilevel governance. It is true that some regeneration actions would have never been carried out without the resources coming from developers, but it is also true that in many areas (especially of the historic centre like S.Lorenzo-Porta Soprana, or Prè) plenty of the new complex urban policy tools insist upon the area and it was the Municipality to coordinate and overlap them.

Paradoxically, within the framework of institutional weakness caused by lack of economic resources, models of governance are operated such as *corporative* and *public managerialism*, that are normally proper to a strong institutional framework. Nonetheless this contradiction is lately coming to an *empasse*. The point is that accomplishing the mission of turning out Genoa to a post-industrial city is a long-lasting work and through the last years the strives have been complicated by the lack of resources transferred from the Central State. This fact is not easily overcome by the capability of the local government or by a strong leadership. The space between the tasks to reach and the lacking of resources are ultimately creating tensions in the way governance has been set until now. For example social services cannot be outsourced as before because there are not enough funding to pay cooperatives providing the services. Inside the new Urban Plan under debate there's an harsh debate about how finding areas for productive activities since incentives to landlord are not so rich to convince them to offer their plots.


**ANNEX 1 - TIMELINE DIAGRAM: POLICIES AND AGENCIES (Regeneration and Social Cohesion)**



**ANNEX 3 - SOCIAL COHESION POLICY - GENOA**




**Annex 5 - Institutional thickness Diagram for Cohesion Policy - Genoa**



Job Centre (Government controlled Company)  
Local Development Plan "Centro Storico" (Partnership)  
Incubator "Cornigliano"  
Carige Bank Foundation  
San Paolo Bank Foundation

**Annex 4 – Regeneration Neighbourhoods**



**Annex 2 - Waterfront and big project Regeneration Model**

